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I. INTRODUCTION
"Then again, virtually every component of globalization's gov-
ernance will have both domestic and international dimen-
sions, each linked to the other to provide the institutional
support for enhanced benefits from globalization."'
In a globalized world, it is not a surprise that constitutionalism
and constitutional litigation, terms that in former times have been
exclusively associated with the nation state, transcend national
borders and claim existence and recognition on a transnational
level, as well. The link between domestic and international di-
mensions of globalization, stressed by one of its apologists
Bhagwati - though with a strong reference to economic assistance
- also exists on the legal level and requires an entanglement of the
different constitutional orders. The European Union (EU) repre-
sents a unique example of not only a supranational organization,
but at the same time, a constitutional attempt to make globaliza-
tion a benefit for all of us.
This article is supposed to give an idea about Germany being in-
tegrated in a European system of entangled and interactive con-
stitutions and constitutional courts.
1. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 223 (2004).
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Therefore, after a brief introduction to the German constitution
(II.A.) and to the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC = Bundesver-
fassungsgericht) as the constitution's important defender 2 (II.B.),
this article presents a closer look at constitutional litigation in
Germany (III.) with a focus on constitutional complaints (III.F.).
Afterwards, to examine the questions of constitutionalism and
constitutional litigation in Europe (IV.), this article will analyze
the EU with regard to its constitutional character and the proce-
dures provided for the individual to enforce, before the Court of
Justice of the EU (ECJ), his/her human rights under EU law
(V.B.). Furthermore, the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, ECHR) including individual complaints
that can be filed before the European Court of Human Rights (EC-
tHR) will be addressed (IV.C.). Finally, the interplay between
those European constitutional orders and the German constitu-
tion, as well as the dialogue between the European constitutional
courts, will be discussed (IV.D.) before a conclusion is drawn about
the future of what I call "patchwork constitutionalism" (IV. E.).
II. CONSTITUTIONALISM IN GERMANY
A. The German Constitution: The Basic Law
Article 1 Basic Law [Human dignity and Human rights]
(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and
inalienable human rights as the basis of every community,
of peace and of justice in the world.
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature,
the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.
3
The Emergence of the Basic Law
4
2. The FCC identifies itself as "Hater der Verfassung" (constitutional defender).
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 20, 1952, 1
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 184 (195). Against this
claim Richard Thoma, Rechtsgutachten betreffend die Stelung des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts, 6 JOR 161, 186 (1957).
3. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], Art. 1.
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Literally, Germany does not have a constitution (Verfassung)
but a "Grundgesetz." That "Basic Law" does meet all the require-
ments necessary to be qualified as a constitution. However, after
the Second World War, the western allies (the United States, the
United Kingdom and France) explicitly asked the prime ministers
of the German states (Bundeslander) to set up a Constituent As-
sembly and to frame a constitution to be adopted by referendum.
That constitution should, inter alia, guarantee human rights and
provide for a democratic and federal structure of the German state
that had to be established bottom-up from the Bundeslander,
while also being endowed with a strong Federal Government.5
Yet, as it became apparent that the eastern part of Germany
under Soviet occupation was not likely to reunite soon with West-
ern Germany, the prime ministers feared that a final constitution
for the western part could perpetuate the division of the country.
Rather, a reunified Germany should adopt a common constitu-
tion.6 For that reason, no Constituent Assembly was established.
Instead, the Constitutional Convention was held at Herrenchi-
emsee, an island on a Bavarian lake. Composed of Ministry offi-
cials and constitutional experts, it prepared a draft for the Par-
liamentary Council. That body consisted of delegates from the
states and approved the Basic Law on May 8, 1949. The constitu-
tion was approved by the allies on May 12, 1949, and was then
ratified by the parliaments of the states. Only Bavaria rejected
the Basic Law, knowing though that an adoption by a two-thirds
majority of the other states' parliaments was sufficient to make
the constitution applicable in that state as well. Promulgated on
May 23, 1949, the Basic Law entered into force at the end of the
same day. It was supposed to be a provisional regulative measure
for a provisional West-German state.7 As we know today, it took a
little bit longer for Germany to reunify (1989) and, contrary to
former Art. 146 of the Basic Law, no common constitution was
agreed upon by the German people per referendum. Instead, the
Basic Law was extended to Eastern Germany after the former
German Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal Republic of
4. See Hans-Peter Schneider, 50 Jahre Grundgesetz - Vom westdeutschen Provisorium
zur gesamtdeutschen Verfassung, 52 NJW 1497 et seq. (1999).
5. Document I of the "Frankfurter Dokumente" (1948) available at
http://ebookbrowse.com/frankfurter-dokumente-pdf-d26260217; see WERNER FROTSCHER I
BODO PIEROTH, VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE, 387, para. 720, (3d ed. 2002).
6. BASIC LAW Art. 146 (referring to the former BASIC LAW ART. 146).
7. Compare Carlo Schmid, Remarks before the Parliamentary Council: "Was heist
eigentlich Grundgesetz?" (Sept. 8, 1948).
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Germany and after a common constitutional commission had pro-
posed a few amendments, some of them finally have been incorpo-
rated into the Basic Law. No one disputes that the Basic Law has
proven to be a sound and solid constitution for Germany. In the
end, the Germans have become proud of their constitution8 and
developed, in a country where patriotism still seems to be suspi-
cious to many, a kind of constitutional patriotism (Verfassung-
spatriotismus).9
The Basic Law -An Overview
Nazi Germany covered the entire continent with an extent of
horror and fear unknown to mankind before. After the defeat of
Nazi Germany, it was not only the allied powers that asked for a
constitution to be a willful and strong renunciation of Nazi Ger-
many. The framers themselves learned their lessons from the ex-
perience with the feeble Constitution of Weimar (1919) that had
enabled the Nazis to gain power so easily:10 Art. 48 (2) enabled
the Reichsprisident (President of the German Empire) to rule the
country by emergency decree (Notverordnungsrecht), including the
power to suspend human rights under the constitution. That
emergency clause was invoked by the ruling Nazi party to fasten
the establishment of their terror-regime. In direct response to the
flagrant atrocities committed by that regime, the recognition and
protection of human dignity was put at the very beginning of the
constitution.'1 It is not only an individual human right that can
be invoked against public authority1 2 but also a fundamental prin-
ciple underpinning the entire constitution and forming the final
benchmark for its interpretation.' 3 German authority has to re-
spect and protect human dignity under all conditions; it is strictly
forbidden to deprive human beings of their humanity and treat
8. Norbert Lammert, the current president of the Bundestag, in an interview recently
called the Basic Law the best constitution that Germany has ever had and presumed that
the entire world admires that constitution, cf. Das Parlament, no. 50/2010, 9.
9. DOLF STERNBERGER, VERFASSUNGSPATRIOTISMUS [CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM],
13 et seq., (1990); Otto Depenheuer, Integration durch Verfassung? Zum Identitdtskonzept
des Verfassungspatriotismus [Integration by constituion? To the identity concept of constitu-
tional patriotism], 48 DOV 854 (1995).
10. See Milan Kuhli, Zur Verfassung von Weimar - Eine Einfuhrung, 31 JURA 321
(2009).
11. BASIC LAw Art. 1(1).
12. WOLFRAM HOFLING, GRUNDGESETZ - KOMMENTAR, Art. 1 paras. 5 et seq, (Michael
Sachs ed., 5th ed. 2009).




them as mere objects. 14 Articles 2 through 19 of the Basic Law
contain the most known and recognized basic rights, including
personal freedoms, 15 equality before the law,16 freedom of faith
and conscience, 17 as well as freedom of expression, arts and sci-
ence,18 freedom of assembly, 19 and association.20 Some of those
rights are human rights granted to anybody, while others are citi-
zen rights for German nationals only. Unlike some states' consti-
tutions, the Basic Law provides for classical human rights but
does not contain human rights of the second and third generation
(like the right to work, water, peace and a sustainable develop-
ment as individual and collective rights). However, some of those
"modern" human rights might be deduced from the human dignity
clause2' and state principles like the social state principle laid out
in Article 20 (1).22 Unlike the constitution of Weimar, which con-
tained a broad human rights catalogue in Articles 109-165, but
neither declared human rights binding upon the legislator nor
made them enforceable by procedural means,23 the basic rights
under the Basic Law are enforceable and directly applicable. 24
Their procedural counterpart, constitutional complaint before the
FCC, 25 has become a forceful sword that can be used by the indi-
vidual to make sure that his/her rights are adequately protected.
Article 20 of the Basic Law enshrines the fundamental state
principles, such as democracy, rule of law, social state and federal-
ism. The content of those principles, having a binding nature on
public authority, is not determined by the constitution itself.26
14. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 3, 2004,
109 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 279 (311) (Ger.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 12, 1997, 96
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 375 (399) (Ger.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 9, 1952, 9
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 89 (95) (Ger.).
15. BASIC LAW Art. 2.
16. BAsIC LAW Art. 3.
17. BASIC LAW Art. 4.
18. BASIC LAW Art. 5.
19. BASIC LAW Art. 8.
20. BASIC LAW Art. 9.
21. BASIC LAw Art. 1.
22. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 9, 2010,
125 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 175 (222 et seq.)
(Ger.).
23. KLAUS STERN, GRUNDRECHTE-KOMMENTAR, Einleitung [Introduction], para. 16, no.
14., (Klaus Stern / Florian Becker eds. 2010).
24. BASIC LAW Art. 1(3).
25. BASIC LAW Art. 93(1), no. 4a.




Accordingly, the FCC is asked to work on developing those princi-
ples to give them a real meaning to the people. Those principles,
as well as the guarantee of human dignity and the federal division
of Germany into the central state and the Bundesldnder, cannot
be changed or abolished, even by constitutional amendment. The
so-called "Eternity Clause"27 protects those essentials of the con-
stitution against even the constitutional legislator. Correspond-
ingly, constitutional litigation might be used by an applicant to
challenge an "unconstitutional" constitutional law. According to
general democratic theories, 28 the Basic Law could not prevent the
German people - as pouvoir constituant _29 from giving them-
selves a new constitution by revolutionary act. However, those
principles are inviolable within the framework provided for by the
German constitution, a system that has opted for a representative
democracy 30 so that constitutional amendments belong to the
elected and determined bodies.31  Art. 21 of the Basic Law
acknowledges that political parties are indispensible for forming
the political will of the people and channeling it into the institu-
tional process of decision-making. Article 23 of the Basic Law is
an expression of the constitutional conception of "open statehood
" 2
and obliges Germany to be a state friendly towards European in-
tegration. This article is also the foundation of Germany's mem-
bership in the supranational EU, to which its member states
transferred several sovereign rights and whose authority acts en-
joy supremacy over domestic law.3 3 Recently amended Article 23
(la) of the Basic Law implements the subsidiarity action 34 into the
Basic Law. According to that provision, the Bundestag and the
27. BASIC LAW Art. 79(3) (this article of the Basic Law is known as the Ewigkeitsklau-
se).
28. The words of Alexis de Tocqueville concerning the sovereign power of the people are
still valid. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 74 (1998).
29. Siey~s stated "dans chaque partie, la constitution n'est pas l'ouvrage du pouvoir
constitu6, mais du pouvoir constituant", thereby establishing the important differentiation
between the constitutional power and the powers created by the constitution. EMMANUEL
JOSEPH SIEYES, QU'EST-CE QUE LE TIERS ETAT? 111 (1789).
30. BERND GRZESZICis, GRUNDGESETZ, Art. 20, para. 66, (Theodor Maunz / Gunter
Durig eds. 2010).
31. BASIC LAW Art. 79(2).
32. Cf. STEPHAN HOBE, DER OFFENE VERFASSUNGSSTAAT ZWISCHEN SOUVERANITAT UND
INTERDEPENDENZ, [THE OPEN CONSTITUTIONAL STATE BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND
INTERDEPENDENCE] 149 (1998).
33. MICHAEL LYSANDER FREMUTH, DIE EUROPAISCHE UNION AUF DEM WEG IN DIE
SUPRANATIONALITAT, [THE EuROPEAN UNION ON THE WAY To SUPRANATIONALITY], 133 et
seq., 194 et seq., (2010); STEPHAN HOBE, EUROPARECHT, 30, 107 (4th ed. 2009).
34. This action is provided for by Art. 8(1) of Protocol 2 on the application of the princi-
ples of subsidiarity and proportionality. OJ 2010, C 83, 206.
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Bundesrat may file a claim to the ECJ arguing that the principle
of subsidiarity has been violated by EU legislation.3 5 Though the
Federal Government has to submit the claim, the Bundesrat or
the Bundestag will remain a party to the proceeding. 36 As a quar-
ter of the members of parliament might force the Bundestag to
initiate such a proceeding, the subsidiarity check, intended to
strengthen the role of national parliaments and protect national
sovereignty, has been formed as a minority right.3
7
Many other provisions of the Basic Law concern the relation be-
tween the federal state and the states. Federal Germany is com-
posed of sixteen Bundesldnder, each of which has its own constitu-
tions, courts, administrations, and laws. Germany has been built
upon the roots of the German states. Accordingly, Article 30 of the
Basic Law determines that the exercise of state power and the
discharge of state functions belong to the states if the constitution
does not set up different rules. 38 The federal level, therefore, de-
pends on an entitlement for action. Lawmaking in particular fol-
lows the enumeration principle,3 9 meaning that the federal state is
competent only if it can invoke a constitutional title. In that case,
however, valid federal law shall take precedence over land law.40
Still, in practice most legal acts are adopted on the federal level,
while the states are responsible for the execution.
Other provisions, especially Articles 38 through 69 of the Basic
Law, create and regulate the constitutional organs, i.e. entities
that are established by the constitution itself and that perform
essential state functions. In short, the German parliament is the
Deutsche Bundestag. Its members are elected by a combination of
personalized and proportional election. The Bundesldnder are
represented and involved in the legislative process via the Bun-
desrat, the Federal Council, consisting of delegates chosen by the
respective states' governments. This chamber, however, is not an
equal lawmaker. Its participation depends on the subject as well
as its impact on the states' level and varies between a mere power
35. BAsic LAW Art. 23(la).
36. § 12 (4) IntVG. Compare SVEN HOLSCHEIDT, DAS RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION,
[THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION] Art. 12 EUV para. 37 (Eberhard Grabitz / Meinhard
Hilf eds. 2010).
37. According to Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack and Andrea Edenharter, this minority
right is not in conformity with EU law. Robert Uerpmann-WittzacklAndrea Edenharter,
Subsidiaritdsklage als parlamentarisches Minderheitsrecht?, 44 EUR, 313, 315 et seq.
(2009).
38. BAsic LAw Art. 30.
39. BAsic LAW Art. 70.
40. BASIC LAW Art. 31.
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to object that can be overridden by the Bundestag and the need of
a real consent. A Mediation Committee can be used to enable leg-
islation in cases in which the legislative bodies cannot reach an
agreement. The Federal President (Bundesprdsident) is the head
of state and has to certify the laws. Besides that, and in contrast
to the huge amount of powers the former Reichsprasident enjoyed,
he/she has a mostly ceremonial function.41 The Federal Govern-
ment consists of the German Chancellor and the Cabinet Minis-
ters. While the Chancellor is elected by the parliament, the Minis-
ters are appointed by the Chancellor himself/herself. The Federal
Government is not only at the head of the federal executive branch
and the visible face of Germany abroad; most notably it is respon-
sible for the political agenda-setting on the federal level. Finally,
the FCC itself has claimed to be a constitutional organ quite ear-
ly,42 an assertion that is indirectly confirmed by § 1 of the FCC-
Act.43
B. The German Federal Constitutional Court
"According to its main task, i.e. to safeguard, to apply and to
develop the German Constitution, [the FCC has] to decide uti-
mately on its interpretation and application. "44
The Status and Task of the FCC
Talking about constitutional litigation in Germany hardly
makes sense without taking a closer look at the FCC, which is the
highest and most important judicial body, as well as the supreme
guardian and interpreter of the German Basic Law. In Germany,
one might conclude that the Basic Law is what the FCC interprets
it to be.45
41. ROMAN HERZOG, GRUNDGESETZ, Art. 54, paras. 88 et seq., (Theodor Maunz / Gunter
Durig eds. 2010).
42. Cf. Denkschrift des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Jun. 27, 1952, 6 J6R 144 et seq.
(1957); contra Bernhard Groffeld, Gtterddmmerung? Zur Stellung des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts, 48 NJW 1719, 1721 (1995).
43. The Act states, "[t]he Federal Constitutional Court shall be a federal court of justice
independent of all other constitutional organs."
44. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 24, 2003,
108 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 282 (295) (Ger.).
45. RUDOLF SMEND, STAATSRECHTLICHE ABHANDLUNGEN UND ANDERE AUFSATZE, 582
(1994). According to JOSEF ISENSEE, the character of the constitution is decided by the
institution who has the final say about the interpretation in cases of conflict. Josef Isensee,
Bundesverfassungsgericht - quo vadis?, 51 Juristenzeitung, 1085 et seq. (1996).
Spring 2011 347
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Although the FCC is a court in a narrow sense, 46 meaning judg-
es have to decide a case by applying legal standards in an inde-
pendent and impartial way, it is not a supreme court of appeal
47
and does not even form part of the regular judicial system. Un-
like, for instance, the United States Supreme Court, the German
FCC is confined to ruling on questions of a constitutional nature.
Its task is only to interpret the constitution and to ensure that
every act of public authority complies with it. Accordingly, the
court's competence is limited to decide if a violation of constitu-
tional law has occurred (Priifung spezifischen Verfassungsrechts).48
The interpretation and application of ordinary (non-constitutional)
law is not within the competencies of the FCC. In that respect,
Germany has several Supreme Courts, i.e. courts that work as
courts of final appeal on the federal level: the Federal Court of
Justice for criminal and civil actions, the Federal Administrative
Court, the Federal Social Court, the Federal Labor Court and the
Federal Finance Court.49 Any court in Germany is bound by the
basic rights50 and has to interpret and give a real meaning to the
constitution. However, the FCC can overrule any judgment in the
event that the deciding court has not sufficiently considered con-
stitutional law. Thus, a constitutional action directed against the
interpretation and application of ordinary law will only be success-
ful if the applicant can argue that the ordinary courts have violat-
ed his/her constitutional rights while performing their respective
tasks.
46. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 22, 2001,
104 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 151 (196) (Ger.);
Denkschrift des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Jun. 27, 1952, 6 JOR 144 et seq. (1957).
47. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15,
1958, 7 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 198 (207) (Ger.)
explaining that the FCC is not a "Superrevisionsinstanz" [highest appellate court]). See
contra CHRISTIAN HILLGRUBER / CHRISTOPH GOOS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT,
[CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION], 1 (2d ed. 2006).
48. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 10, 1964,
18 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 85 (92) (Ger.). Accord-
ing to Helmut Schulze-Fielitz the term "spezifisches Verfassungsrecht" can hardly be de-
fined. Helmut Schulze-Fielitz, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht in der Krise des Zeitgeists -
Zur Metadogmatik der Verfassungsinterpretation, 122 AOR 5 et seq. (1997).
49. BASIC LAW Art.95(1); Germany also has a Federal Patent Court, which is subordi-
nate to the Federal Supreme Court. BASIC LAW Art. 96(1), (3).
50. BASIC LAW Art. 1(3); BASIC LAW Art. 20(3).
348 Vol. 49
Patchwork Constitutionalism
Composition and Organization of the FCC
The FCC is not attached to a Federal Ministry, but rather, it is
a self-governing judicial entity having its own budget. 51 It is seat-
ed in Karlsruhe 52 and consists of two senates (panels), as well as
several chambers. 53 Every senate is composed of eight judges
54
and is capable of making decisions when at least six of them are
present.55 The judges, unlike other federal judges, are not in pub-
lic employment, but their positions are influenced by the constitu-
tional character of their work. Therefore, the Deutsches Richterg-
esetz (Federal Judges Act), according to its § 69, applies to judges
at the FCC only as far as it complies with their special status un-
der the constitution and the FCC-Act, i.e. the constitutional na-
ture of their task.56 Each senate itself constitutes the FCC in legal
terms and, with regard to a decision taken by one of the senates,
there is no remedy granted by the other senate of the court. At
least three judges in each senate shall originate from the other
federal courts 57 to ensure that sufficient practical experience is
present in the court. Many of the other members are law profes-
sors, which is the only profession that might be held while serving
as a judge at the FCC.58 The members of the FCC are elected,
with a two-thirds majority, half by the Bundestag and half by the
Bundesrat.59 Whereas the Federal Council votes directly, the
Bundestag has set up an election commission reflecting the politi-
cal representation of the parliament. Although the constitutional-
ity of such an intermediary body is disputed, no one has ever initi-
ated a proceeding against it.
The Public Reception and Political Relevance of the FCC
The FCC is held in highest esteem by the German public. 60 For
many, it has been sought out as a last resort to defend their basic
51. The total budget in 2011 will amount to C 25 millions, see Das Parlament, no.
38/2010, 5.
52. Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I], 243, § 1(2) (Ger.).
53. Id. at § 2(1).
54. Id. at § 2(2).
55. Id. at § 15(2).
56. Federal Judges Act of Germany § 69.
57. Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 2(3) (Ger.).
58. Id. at § 3(4).
59. Id. at § 5-7.
60. Hans-Peter Schneider, 50 Jahre Grundgesetz - Vom westdeutschen Provisorium zur
gesamtdeutschen Verfassung, 52 NJW, 1497, 1500 (1999); cf. UWE WESEL, DER GANG NACH
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rights and to seek redress for alleged violations. Even though
members of the FCC are elected by politicians after political nego-
tiations and bargaining, the court is not a political organ and has
proven its independence and impartiality in many judgments and
decisions. The court has never flinched from rendering unpopular
judgments, 61 further augmenting its popularity. Its jurisprudence,
especially regarding the most controversial decisions, is somehow
swinging. On the one hand, the FCC demonstrates reluctance and
a willingness to defer the solution of conflicts and controversial
questions to society and its self-regulative abilities. On the other
hand, there is a tendency of rigor towards the use of public author-
ity, especially criminal sanctions, and the FCC has even been very
concrete in determining how the lawmaker has to proceed in some
cases. 62
The German constitution is a framework containing vague and
broad provisions. Interpreting a constitution often means to
breathe life into the constitution, giving it a meaning that meets
the current needs and demands of the society and the people. In
that sense, a constitution should be regarded as a "living instru-
ment"63 - a term used to justify an approach of interpretation that
intends to fill those gaps resulting from the restricted view the
framers had anticipating future developments 64 and to prevent the
petrifaction of constitutional law.65 It seems persuasive that the
document that is supposed to be the legal foundation for a society
has to adopt and correspond to the development of that society so
KARLSRUHE, - DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT IN DER GESCHICHTE DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK, [The Road to Karlsruhe: The Federal Constitutional Court in the History of the
Federal Republic]., 413 (2004) discussing a historical overview.
61. For a recent example cp. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Feb. 9, 2010, 125 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 175 (Ger.) (deciding that the calculation of
social welfare granted to the poor, in particular for children, was inadequate, which finally
will lead to a modest increase of public spending).
62. Helmut Schulze-Fielitz, Das Bundesuerfassungsgericht in der Krise des Zeitgeists -
Zur Metadogmatik der Verfassungsinterpretation, 122 AoR, 5 et. seq. (1997).
63. The living instrument approach is disputed in particular among United States
lawyers. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, 2010 (discussing the case law
of the Supreme Court). See generally ROBERT H. BORK, A COUNTRY I Do NOT RECOGNIZE -
THE LEGAL ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES (2005) (Explaining the theory of originalism and
arguing that a living constitution is not a constitution at all. The Supreme Court, following
a political agenda, is the only remaining sacred institution).
64. This approach of interpreting a legal document plays an important role in human
rights law. Cf. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, no. 5856/72 Eur. Ct. H.R., § 31 (1978).
65. HERBERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 31, para. 7, (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu I
Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds. 2010).
350 Vol. 49
Patchwork Constitutionalism
that it does not become a moot and dead document. One peculiari-
ty of a constitution is its fixed and enduring structure, which puts
a high burden on amendments to protect it against short term
trends. Interpreting it as a living instrument provides a balance
between the difficulties and limits of constitutional amendments
on the one hand, and current demands to which the constitution
should respond on the other. Accordingly, the FCC deduced, some
argue invented, new basic rights like the right to privacy and data
protection (Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung)66 and the
protection of IT-systems (Schutz informationstechnischer Sys-
teme).67 Like presumably any constitutional court, the FCC has
never been merely la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi or
an itre inanimj 68 as, indeed, the concretion of a constitution often
has a huge political impact and contains a moment of creation. 69
Recent decisions of the FCC, e.g. on the incompatibility of a law
allowing the shooting down of an aircraft captured by terrorists
with human dignity of the other passengers 70 and the calculation
of social welfare being unconstitutional, 71 have provoked no lesser
public and scientific debate than the decisions on abortion 72 or on
civil partnership for same sex couples 73 did in the past.
Accordingly, and as the line between interpreting the constitu-
tion and making a political decision is sometimes hard to draw,
74
66. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1983,
65 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (Ger.).
67. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 27, 2008,
120 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 274 (Ger.).
68. CHARLES-Louis MONTESQUIEU, OEUVRES COMPLETES, TOME I: ESPRIT DES LOIS, 257
et seq., 1820,
69. Compare Helmut Schulze-Fielitz, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht in der Krise des
Zeitgeists - Zur Metadogmatik der Verfassungsinterpretation, 122 A6R 5, 14 (1997).
70. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 15, 2006,
115 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 118 (Ger.).
71. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 9, 2010,
125 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 175 (222 et seq.)
(Ger.).
72. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975,
39 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (Ger.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 88
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 203 (Ger.)..
73. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 22, 2002
105 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 313 (Ger.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 7, 2009, 124
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 199 (Ger.). On the recent
development and the European influence on the interpretation of the Basic Law concerning
same sex couples, cp. Michael Lothar, Lebenspartnerschaften unter dem besonderen Schutz
einer (6ber)staatlichen Ordnung, 63 NJW 3537 (2010).
74. Leibholz, a former judge and expert in constitutional law, convincingly argued that
there is a political question behind any constitutional dispute and stated that constitutional
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the FCC is occasionally blamed for being too political. 75 Especially
with regard to its competence of declaring an act of parliament to
be null and void, this criticism has to be taken seriously. Indeed,
the court benefits from constructive criticism, as any open society
and pluralistic democracy does. 76 However, when addressing that
criticism, one has to bear in mind that there is no "political ques-
tions doctrine" in Germany that allows the court to refrain from
deciding a case due to its political meaning. 77 Even though, the
FCC is not competent to decide merely political disputes, it has to
decide legal disputes of a political nature that often occur when it
comes to constitutional law. 78 Correspondingly, judicial restraint
in a narrow sense would not be allowed under German law.
79
Once the jurisdiction of the FCC is established and a constitution-
al action is admissible, the court has to render a decision
(Entscheidungspflicht).80 If there is a legal norm serving as a
benchmark for the decision of the case, the political nature and
law means political law in the sense that politics becomes the object of legal codification, see
Gerhard Leibholz, Der Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 6 JOR 111, 120 et seq. (1957).
75. For an explanation see Helmut Schulze-Fielitz, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht in
der Krise des Zeitgeists - Zur Metadogmatik der Verfassungsinterpretation,6 AoR 5, 20 et.
seq. (1997) (referring to the development of the society as becoming more pluralistic and
individualistic as well as the protection of minorities). A quite critical stance invoking a
crisis of legitimacy because of controversial decisions is taken by Josef Isensee, Bundesver-
fassungsgericht - quo vadis? 51 Juristenzeitung 1085, 1091 et seq. (1996). Cp. further Hans-
Peter Schneider, 50 Jahre Grundgesetz - Vom westdeutschen Provisorium zur
gesamtdeutschen Verfassung, 52 NJW 1497, 1501 (1999). See also Bernhard Grolfeld, Got-
terddmmerung? Zur Stellung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 48 NJW 1719, 1720 et passim
(1995) (arguing that the parliament gets deposed by a small group of people beyond any
control).
76. Josef Isensee, Bundesverfassungsgericht - quo vadis?, 51 Juristenzeitung 1085 et
seq. (1996), holds that the FCC needs criticism and can bear it. On the limits of criticism see
Andreas Vol3kuhle, Der Grundsatz der Verfassungsorgantreue und die Kritik am Bun-
desverfassungsgericht, 50 NJW 2216 (1997).
77. GERD MORGENTHALER, GRUNDGESETz, Art. 93, para. 4, (Volker Epping / Christian
Hillgruber eds. 2010).
78. Gerhard Leibholz, Der Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Bericht des Ber-
ichtserstatters and das Plenum des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zur ,,Status"-Frage,
29.03.1952, 6 J6R 121, 125 (1957).
79. JOSEF ISENSEE, HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS VII, § 162, para. 85, (Josef Isensee /
Paul Kirchhoff eds. 1992). The call for restraint, e.g. by Rolf Lamprecht, Vom Untertan zum
Burger -Wie das Bonner Grundgesetz an seinem Karlsruher Uber-lIch" gewachsen ist, 62
NJW 1454 et seq. (2009), is likely to have a different meaning, i.e. an appeal to remain
within the competencies granted.
80. HERBERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 31, para. 15, (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu /
Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds., 2010), which was cited by the FCC in
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 2009, 122 ENTScHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 304 (207) (Ger.) (stating that the Bundestag does not
have a duty to examine the constitutionality of an election because it does not have the
competence of annulment. As the FCC enjoys this competence, it has such a duty).
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impact of a question does not relieve the FCC from the duty to de-
cide. That duty to offer judicial protection is the corollary of the
task of defending the constitution and the right to review. Thus,
the FCC is not entitled to restrain itself as to the question of
whether to exercise jurisdiction.8l In line with this argumenta-
tion, the FCC explained that judicial restraint, a principle it once
claimed to adhere to, does not affect its obligation to enforce the
constitutional order, but only contains the duty to refrain from
making politics.8 2 This confirms that the FCC is not entitled to
judicial activism8 3 and demonstrates the attempt of the FCC to
confine itself to judicial review rather than becoming a substitute
legislator. For instance, the court respects the prerogative of the
Federal Government concerning foreign affairs8 4 and the discre-
tion enjoyed by the legislative branch deciding fundamental ques-
tions for the society.8 5 However, in Germany that does not appear
as a question of jurisdiction, but as a question of control density.
So even if the FCC decides that a law is unconstitutional, it often
refrains from prescribing a concrete solution. It refers such ques-
tions back to the political discretion of the lawmaker while disclos-
ing the constitutional restraints for further action. Yet, as there
might be a tendency of politicians to shift more and more deci-
sions, especially the tough ones, to "Karlsruhe,"8 6 not becoming a
substitute lawmaker8 7 will be a challenge for the FCC even in the
future.88 Yet and without doubt, as the FCC is not elected by the
public and, thus, not dependent on voters and popular favor, its
81. Dietrich Murswiek, Der Umfang der verfassungsgerichtlichen Kontrolle staatlicher
6ffentlichkeitsarbeit - Zum Grundsatz des,judicial self-restraint, "35 DOV 529 (1982).
82. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 31, 1973,
36 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (14) (Ger.).
83. CHRISTIAN HILLGRUBER / CHRISTOPH Goos, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 47 (2d ed.,
2006).
84. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 7, 2008,
121 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 135 (Ger.).
85. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1985,
71 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 66 (Ger);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 23, 1990, 81
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 156 (Ger.).
86. Rolf Lamprecht, Vom Untertan zum Bdirger - Wie das Bonner Grundgesetz an
seinem Karlsruher"Uber-lch" gewachsen ist, 62 NJW 1454-56 (2009). Lambrecht states
that misuse of the FCC is a "policy with a different means"
87. See CHRISTINE LANDFRIED, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT UND GESETZGEBER
(1984).
88. The second decision on abortion, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 81 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 203 (Ger.), may serve as a counter-example,
reminding one more of a statute than of a judgment.
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voice is indispensable in a chorus of freedom, responsibility, the
rule of law and human rights.
In the end, and as former Federal President and Chief Justice
Roman Herzog put into words, the full story is less a story of will-
ful intervention of the FCC in the political sphere, but its in-
volvement by citizens who file a constitutional complaint. 89 The
relevance of the FCC and subsequent intervention can therefore
be regarded as the corollary of this individual remedy's success. 90
The possibility of using the individual and his/her personal inter-
est as a tool to ensure constitutionality is allowed by the constitu-
tion and not an arrogation of competencies by the court. The
overwhelming acceptance of the FCC is of utmost importance for
Germany's success as a democratic society dedicated to the rule of
law. The FCC has no means to enforce its judgments and deci-
sions; accordingly, its acceptance by the people as the constitu-
tion's ultimate defenders guarantees that no government will ig-
nore them.91
The Binding Force and Enforcement of Constitutional Deci-
sions
The lack of enforcement methods, though, does not affect the
binding force of the FCC's decisions, which is taken for granted as
a non-written principle by the constitution and confirmed by the
FCC Act.92 As a court, the FCC decides and not only recommends.
Generally, there is no exemption for FCC decisions that are un-
lawful, even though scholars discuss a deviation for decisions be-
ing an obvious violation of the law. 93 The binding force in a formal
89. ROMAN HERZOG, STRUKTURMANGEL DER VERFASSUNG? ERFAHRUNGEN MIT DEM
GRUNDGESETZ, 128 et seq., (2010).
90. This success brought Richard Thoma to argue for an abolishment of constitutional
complaint in Richard Thoma, Rechtsgutachten betreffend die Stellung des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts, 6 JSR 161, 185 (1957).
91. For the people as the final enforcers of the constitution see Tom Ginsburg / Eric A.
Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1589 (2010).
92. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 15, 1988,
78 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 320 (328) (Ger.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 22, 2001, 104
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 151 (196) (Ger.). For
further reading see Herbert Bethge, Die Rechtskraft im Verfassungsprozessrecht, 77
(Christian Heinrich ed., Festschrift fir Musielak 2004).
93. HERBERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETA, [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AcT], § 31, para. 11 (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreul
Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds. 2010).
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sense means that - with an exception for interim measures
94 -
those court's decisions concluding the proceedings cannot be chal-
lenged by appeal and therefore become automatically final with
their promulgation. 95 Complaints existing on the level of the EU
or within the framework of the ECHR do not constitute instru-
ments of appeal against the FCC's decision. It cannot lead to a
repeal and, thus, cannot prevent the FCC's decision from becom-
ing final (formelle Rechtskraft).96  In substance (materielle
Rechtskraft),97 the binding force pacifies the dispute by excluding
that the same subject-matter of the dispute between the same par-
ties within the relevant period of time might be brought before
another court. 98 Therefore, res judicata prohibits any repetition of
the proceedings99 if and as far as the subject-matter has been de-
cided (objective restriction). Furthermore, a temporal restriction
does apply as the binding force lasts and is only effective so long
as the legal and factual premises remain the same.
The subjective restriction concerns the scope of organs/persons
covered by the principle of binding force. First, and in accordance
with general theory, the FCC's decisions are binding among the
parties concerned (inter partes). Any extension to persons not par-
ties depends on an explicit legal regulation. This is true not as a
result of the binding force, but because of the principle of mutual
loyalty among constitutional organs (Prinzip der Verfassungsor-
gantreue):100 first, other constitutional organs are obliged to follow
the rulings of the court. Second, Section 31 (1) of the FCC Act ex-
tends the binding force upon federal and state constitutional or-
94. Cf. Gesetz uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Con-
stituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 32 (3) (Ger.).
95. MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT, 182 (3d ed. 2010) (non-appealability is
known as formelle Rechtskraft).
96. Herbert Bethge, Die Rechtskraft im Verfassungsprozessrecht, 77, 82 (Christian
Heinrich & Festschrift fir Musielak, eds., 2004).
97. For further reading, see MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT, 182 et seq.
(3d ed. 2010).
98. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 22, 2001,
104 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 151 (196) (Ger.). For
more detail concerning the controversial questions see HERBERT BETHGE,
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 31, para.
42 et seq. (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu / Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds.,
2010).
99. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 24, 1985,
69 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 72 (103) (Ger.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 19, 1991, 85
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 117 (121) (Ger.).
100. Helmut Schulze-Fielitz, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht in der Krise des Zeitgeists -
Zur Metadogmatik der Verfassungsinterpretation, 122 AOR 1, (27 et. seq.) (1997).
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gans as well as on all courts and authorities. 101 This constitutes a
subjective extension of the binding force to all branches of public
authority, necessary to cover those who have not been part of the
proceedings.10 2 The norm remains somewhat controversial in its
details, 03 which will not be discussed here. However, the FCC
itself is not covered by Section 31 of the FCC Act, but only bound
by its own decision within a concrete proceeding. 10 4 Thus, it may
deviate in future proceedings deciding a comparable but different
question in the opposite. 0 5 In contrast, the lawmaker is bound.
Yet, it is disputed whether the legislator is hindered from enacting
a law that is the same as the law that has been declared unconsti-
tutional. 10 6 A question without practical relevance, as the threat
of a defeat in future times, should the case make it to the FCC,
will trigger the lawmaker to follow the ruling of the FCC. Third,
Section 31 (2) of the FCC Act grants the force of law to decisions
on the constitutionality of legal norms - a case sui generis only for
the FCC that underlines the utmost importance of the court.
10 7
Should the FCC declare a legal norm to be null and void, the im-
pact of that decision is extended to the general public (inter et erga
omnes), including private persons among themselves and in their
relation to the state. 08 To avoid a petrifaction of the constitution,
many scholars restrict the binding force to the operative provision
of the decision, whereas the FCC stresses that also the main sup-
101. Gesetz uiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 31 (1) (Ger.).
102. HERBERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 31, para. 122 et seq. (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-
Bleibtreu / Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds., 2010).
103. HERBERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 31, para. 75 et seq. (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-
Bleibtreu / Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds., 2010); Hanno Kube, Die Bindungswirkung
der Normverwerfung - Zur Stelung der Parlamente im Verfassungsstaat, 55 DOV 737
(2002).
104. Herbert Bethge, Die Rechtskraft im Verfassungsprozessrecht, 77, 81 et seq.
(Christian Heinrich ed., Festschrift ffir Musielak, 2004).
105. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Aug. 11, 1954, 4
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 31 (38); HERBERT
BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], §
31, para. 35. (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu / Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge
eds., 2010).
106. HERBERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 31, para. 71 (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu /
Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds. 2010).
107. Gesetz iiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 31 (2) (Ger.).
108. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 21, 1997,
97 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 117 (122) (Ger.).
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porting reasons (ratio decidendi) of the judgment entail binding
force enhanced by Section 31 of the FCC Act.109 Obiter dicta are -
de jure - not covered by the binding force but certainly have a
huge factual impact.
Finally, Section 35 of the FCC Act entitles the FCC to decide
about the enforcement of its decision, including the decision con-
cerning the competent authority and the concrete manner.110 The
broad interpretation of this clause by the FCC has provoked some
criticism 1 ' as the court regards itself as competent to prescribe
legal effects similar to statutory law." 2 Again, the warning not to
become a substitute lawmaker has to be repeated when it comes to
the interpretation and application of that clause.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION IN GERMANY
"Constitutional jurisdiction constitutes a structural principle
of the German state under the Basic Law""
3
What worth is a right that cannot be enforced? On the interna-
tional level, the tendency towards individual complaint proce-
dures 1 4 confirms the paramount meaning of procedural measures
for an adequate protection of human rights. The same holds true
for the protection of competencies granted to state organs. Obvi-
ously, constitutional litigation is the counterpart of constitutional
guarantees and an essential element of constitutionalism itself.
In Germany, constitutional jurisdiction (Verfassungsgerichts-
barkeit) constitutes a structural principle of the state under the
Basic Law.
109. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 20, 1996,
19 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 177 (391) (Ger.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 10, 1975, 40
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 88 (94) ; BVerfG, 2 BvR
104/87, 41 NJW 1988, 249.
110. Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 35 (Ger.).
111. HERBERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 31, para. 2 et seq. (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-
Bleibtreu / Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds. 2010).
112. Compare Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul.
31, 1973, 36 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (88, 203)
(Ger.).
113. Hans H. Klein, Das Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 20 et seq. (J6m Ipsen ed.,
Recht-Staat-Gemeinwohl, Festschrift flir Dietrich Rauschning, 2001).
114. The most far-reaching procedure is most likely Art. 34 of the ECHR, which is fur-
ther discussed in Section IV(C) below. Furthermore, there is a recent and strong movement
towards the establishment of an individual complaint procedure as Third Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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A. Introduction and General Principles of Constitutional Litiga-
tion
"Constitutional jurisdiction forms the crown of the system of
legal protection"15
In Germany, constitutional litigation is open to individuals and
private associations, as well as to the Bundesldnder, the federal
state represented by the Federal Government, state organs,
branches of government, municipalities, members of parliament
and political parties. Germany has made a decision to follow the
model of separation (Trennungsmodell), i.e. establishing constitu-
tional jurisdiction distinct from ordinary courts and putting it in
the hands of the FCC (on the federal level). This model has
emerged as a huge success. The procedure of individual constitu-
tional complaint forms the vast majority of all constitutional rem-
edies with a total number of 6,508 initiated proceedings in 2009.
Even though only about 2% of the complaints filed are successful,
the mere number shows that the personal interest of individuals is
an adequate tool to bring constitutional questions before the FCC.
Besides the request for interim measures (not addressed in this
article), the procedure of concrete judicial review, initiated by or-
dinary courts, is of factual importance (forty-seven initiated pro-
ceedings in 2009). Other constitutional remedies do not play a
major role, based on their total numbers, but occasionally lead to
some important decisions. Furthermore, the other constitutional
remedies are still important for understanding the theoretical un-
derpinnings of the constitution and will therefore be briefly ad-
dressed here as well.
As an introduction to constitutional litigation in Germany, this
article must focus on the most important remedies, and as such,
confines itself to constitutional litigation under the federal consti-
tution with regard to federal law. At the outset, some general
principles regulating constitutional litigation before the FCC and
demonstrating that it is a real court in the narrow sense 1 6 shall
be addressed.
115. GERD ROELLECKE, HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS III, § 67 para. 10 (Josef Isensee /
Paul Kirchhof eds., 3d ed. 2005).
116. The principles to address are very much similar to the general characteristics of
judicial powers already named by Alexis de Tocqueville. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 43 (Henry Reeve trans., 1998).
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First, jurisdiction of the FCC is ruled by the enumeration prin-
ciple and the absence of the court's right of initiative.117 As no
blanket clause exists in German law, the FCC depends on a con-
crete title to justify it exercising jurisdiction. Those titles can be
found in Article 93 of the Basic Law in conjunction with Section 13
and further of the FCC Act. Since the competence to render advi-
sory opinions (formerly under Section 97 of the FCC Act) has been
abolished in the 1950's, the FCC is no longer able to respond to
abstract and hypothetical questions, but instead has to decide con-
crete cases on the basis of constitutional law. Accordingly, appli-
cations asking for an opinion on a hypothetical question would be
inadmissible. 118 The FCC's status as "defender of the constitution"
is a result of competencies, but not a justification for usurping
competencies not conferred upon the court.11 9
Second, every remedy the FCC Act allows depends on an appli-
cation. Even though constitutional litigation also promotes the
general interest that society has in the constitution being respect-
ed, the FCC is not enabled to render a decision1 20 without an ap-
plicant. 121 This general principle in German procedural law (i.e.
no judge without an applicant) also applies to constitutional litiga-
tion and conveys the assumption that a personal or institutional
interest in defending rights and competencies is a solid basis for
enforcing the constitution as a whole. However, the withdrawal of
an application does not hinder the FCC from continuing the pro-
ceeding and taking a decision in case of a prevailing public inter-
est.1 22 As a general rule,1 23 Section 23 of the FCC Act stipulates
117. MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT, 3 (3d ed. 2010).
118. STEFAN MOCKL, RECHTSSCHUTZ IM OFFENTLICHEN RECHT 375, para. 42, (Dirk Eh-
lers / Friedrich Schoch, 2009).
119. HERBERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 1, para. 53 (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu /
Franz Klein I Herbert Bethge eds. 2010).
120. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 20, 1952,
1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 184 (196) (Ger.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 2009, 122
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 304 (306) (Ger.).
121. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 20, 1952,
1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 184 (196) (Ger.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG1 [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 2009, 122
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 304 (306) (Ger.).
122. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 26, 2005, 1
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 396 (414); Bundesver.
fassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 22, 1958, 8
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 183 (184). Contra Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 18, 1969, 25
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 308 (309).
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that the application shall be in written form and signed by the
applicant; the assertions have to be substantiated, coherent and
justified; and evidence has to be named and specified. 124 The ap-
plication may be filed by telegram 125 or fax, 126 whereas an e-mail
does not meet the requirement of a written application.
27
Third, to file a constitutional remedy requires legal standing
(locus standi). The applicant has to show a legal interest in the
outcome of the proceedings which is given if the individual or the
organ defends his/her own rights or its respective competencies.
Generally, German law does not provide for popular action. That
principle applies to constitutional law as well, 28 though some con-
stitutional remedies are open to a minority within a state organ
enforcing the right of the entire organ (e.g. the political minority
in the Bundestag). However, in case of constitutional litigation,
there are some procedures serving an objective and general inter-
est. Thus, even though the number of potential applicants is re-
stricted, an interest of their own is not always required.
Fourth, this legal interest must last until the end of the pro-
ceeding. In case of the demise of the applicant, as well as an alter-
ation of facts or the law, the remedy might become moot and thus
inadmissible. However, the FCC has minimized the effects of the
requirement of a continuing interest (and thereby enlarged its ju-
risdiction) by regarding itself competent to decide a case irrespec-
tive of a continuing interest of the applicant if there is an objective
interest in clarifying a constitutional question.
29
123. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 2009,
122 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 304 (308).
124. Gesetz iiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 23 (Ger.).
125. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 20, 1954, 4
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 7 (12).
126. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 6, 2007,
docket number 1 BvR 1423/07, 4. (Ger.), available at JURIS.
127. STEFAN BRINK, DIE VERFASSUNGSBESCHWERDE 17 (Bodo Pieroth / Peter Silberkuhl
eds. 2008).
128. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 13, 1953, 2
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 292 (294); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 4, 1987, 77 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 263 (268).
129. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 2009,
122 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFGE] 304 (306) (Ger.) (con-
cerning the scrutiny of elections to the Bundestag.).
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B. Dispute between State Organs 3o
Rationale
In a system of checks and balances where various branches of
government have different competencies and are expected to work
together in a system of mutual respect and control, the constitu-
tion has to provide a mechanism for the peaceful and law-based
settlement of disputes. The FCC is a cornerstone of that system in
Germany and the Organstreit (dispute between state organs) illus-
trates a German constitutional tradition that can hardly be found
elsewhere. 131 Within that contradictory 132 proceeding, the court is
asked to decide disputes between state organs about their respec-
tive competencies under the Basic Law. Thereby, conflicts among
constitutional organs should be resolved by the means of law. The
FCC, as an impartial and independent court, is regarded to be
neutral enough to take on tasks such as telling other constitution-
al organs what their competencies are. Furthermore, that pro-
ceeding serves the interest of minorities as they can enforce their
rights and even the rights of an organ dominated by the opposing
political party (in particular the Bundestag).
Admissibility
Under Article 93 (1), no. 1 of the Basic Law, parties can be su-
preme federal bodies and other parties vested with rights of their
own by the Basic Law or by the rules of procedure of a supreme
federal body. 133 Accordingly, the Federal President, Bundestag
and Bundesrat, as well as the Federal Government, 134 can be party
to the dispute proceeding. Furthermore, minorities might file a
representative action before the FCC for the organ they are part
of. So, the fraction in parliament (parliamentary group) can file a
remedy to defend their minority rights, as well as the right of the
130. BASIC LAW Art. 93(1), no. 1; Gesetz iiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act]
[Law on the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 13, no. 5, 63-67
(Ger.). See generally CHRISTIAN HnhLGRUBER I CHRISTOPH Goos,
VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT, [CONsTITUTIoNAL LITIGATION], 120 -152 (2d ed. 2006).
131. KLAUS SCHLAICH, DA BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 52 et seq. (8th ed. 2010).
132. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 22, 1966,
20 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 18 (23).
133. BASIC LAW Art. 93(1), no. 1.
134. Compare Gesetz uiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal
Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 63 (Ger.).
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organ itself.135 This further serves the objective interest in the
parliament fulfilling the duty to control the government - a gov-
ernment that might be protected and shielded by the supporting
majority in the Bundestag.136  Under certain and controversial
circumstances, even single members of parliament 137 and political
parties 138 can be a party to defend their constitutional rights and
status, even though single members of the parliament are not en-
titled to enforce the rights of the Bundestag as a whole. 139 Even
though Section 63 of the FCC Act does not enumerate members of
parliament and political parties, they were read into the constitu-
tion as "other parties" in the sense of Article 93 (1), no. 1 of the
Basic Law. This interpretation, not being undisputed, 140 under-
lines in particular the importance of political parties for the politi-
cal process and their status as comparable to constitutional or-
gans.' 4 ' Furthermore, it strengthens the role of the members of
parliament and, because they are elected by the German people, of
democracy. As the constitution trumps the FCC Act, the latter's
narrow interpretation of potential applicants and respondents
cannot be exhaustive. 42 However, if the remedy does not concern
the political and constitutional status, i.e. if the member in par-
liament or the party act in a private capacity, not affected as part
135. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 27, 1982,
60 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 319 (325 et seq.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 18, 1984, 65
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (65, 77); 121 BVerfGE
135 (150).
136. KLAUS SCHLAICH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 62 et seq. (8th ed. 2010).
137. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 14, 1959, 10
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 4 (10); Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 21, 1971, 32 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 157 (162); Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 29, 1983, 64 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 301 (312); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 11, 2007, 118 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 277 (317).
138. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Apr. 5, 1952, 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE]
208 (223 et seq.).
139. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 12, 1994, 90
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 286 (343 et seq.); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 12, 2007 117,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 359 (367 et seq.).
140. But see KLAUS SCHLAICH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 58 (8th ed. 2010).
141. BAsir LAw Art. 21.
142. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 11, 1961, 13
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 54 (81 et seq.).
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of constitutional life, they have to resort to constitutional com-
plaint.
143
Article 93 (1), no. 1 of the Basic Law contains the expression
"supreme federal body," accordingly besides the just mentioned
exemptions, any further organs can be a party if they are located
on the federal level and if they are not subordinated to any other
organ. 144 For instance, the Federal Assembly (non-permanent
constitutional body to elect the Federal President) and the Media-
tion Committee (a body for reconciliation between Bundestag and
Bundesrat in legislative procedures) can be parties. However, the
German people (Deutsches Volk) does not belong to the highest
federal organs. 145 Even though the ultimate sovereignty rests
with the people, it lacks the necessary degree of organization to be
called an organ.
Subject matter of the proceeding is a measure, action or omis-
sion of the respondent that impacts on the legal sphere of the ap-
plicant. To file an admissible claim the applicant has to prove le-
gal standing, i.e. he/she has to assert that this action or omission
has harmed or directly endangered him/her or the organ of which
he/she is a member in the rights and duties granted to him/her or
to the organ by the Basic Law or the rules of procedure of the
Bundestag or Bundesrat. As a question of admissibility, the appli-
cant only has to persuade the court of the possibility of a breach of
constitutional obligations and a suffered harm. 46 This require-
ment is evidence of the contradictory character of the Organstreit
meaning that this procedure is less an objective action than a
remedy to enforce rights and competencies. The action or omis-
sion - presuming it actually occurred - ought to be material and to
143. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 29, 1983,
64 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 301 (313); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 20, 1954, 4
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 27 (31); Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 30, 1962, 14 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 121 (129) (if members of parliament or
political parties are not affected in their constitutional status, they may file a constitutional
complaint).
144. BASIc LAw Art. 93(1), no. 1. For a comprehensive review see KLAUS SCHLAICH, DAS
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 55 (8th ed. 2010).
145. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. Jul. 11,
1961, 13 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 54 (85,95);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 24, 1982, 60
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 175 (200 et seq.).
146. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 22, 2001,
104 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 14 (19); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 28, 2005, 112
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 363 (365).
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have a real impact on the applicant. The interpretation of a norm
as to whether it actually provides for a competence of the appli-
cant can already be addressed at this stage of the proceeding.
Should it be obvious that a right or competence of the applicant
does not exist, the remedy is already inadmissible. As an exam-
ple, a member of parliament might invoke the right of a free man-
date, 147 but he/she is not entitled, in that respect, to rely on basic
rights (e.g. the right to freedom of speech under Article 5 (1) of the
Basic Law if his/her speech in parliament is interrupted), as those
rights are granted only to individuals not acting in a public func-
tion.
The application has to be filed within six months after the act in
question occurred or should have been done in case of an omis-
sion.148 Generally, a legal interest in the decision has to persist
until the end of the proceeding. However, the FCC has developed
some exemptions to this general rule as explained above. 49 The
court renders a declaratory judgment whether the act or omission
of the opposing party infringes a provision of the Basic Law. Ex-
ceeding the wording of Section 67 of the FCC Act and stressing the
contradictory character of the Organstreit, the court has occasion-
ally even declared that the applicant has been infringed in its
rights. 50 The decision has inter partes-effect but does not have
the force of law in the sense of Section 31 (2) of the FCC Act. The
parties are obliged to follow the judgment, which is not enforcea-
ble eo ipso though.' 51 Yet, the Basic Law expects the constitution-
al organs to voluntarily follow the rulings of the FCC without fur-
ther enforcement measures. This includes, if necessary, the
amendment and alteration of an unconstitutional law as the FCC
in the Organstreit-procedure may not annul a law itself.
Relevance
The state organ dispute proceeding has a limited relevance in
practical terms, which is confirmed by plain numbers: only two
initiated proceeding in 2009. It is of some importance for political
parties to enforce their rights as quasi-constitutional bodies or for
147. BASIC LAW Art. 38(1).
148. Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 64 (3) (Ger.).
149. See infra Part III(A).
150. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 25, 1977,
45 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (3).
151. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 29, 1952, 1
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 351 (371).
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the political minority in the parliament to safeguard the rights of
the minority or the entire Bundestag against the political majori-
ty. When it comes to legislation, this remedy might theoretically
be used against statutory law arguing the parliament has violated
a constitutional right by adopting the law. With regard to the lim-
ited effects of the decision, as mentioned above, the review proce-
dures are much more important, as in those proceedings the FCC
not only declares that a violation has occurred, but can also de-





In a federal state, disputes may not only occur between consti-
tutional organs but also on a vertical level between the federal
branch and the states. Similar to any federal entity, the federal
constitution has the final say about the relation and competencies
between the federal and the state level. It contains the decisive
rules and, in Germany, is characterized by the enumeration prin-
ciple, stating that the federal level depends on powers conferred
by the constitution before it can take action. 15 4 Correspondingly,
the Basic Law offers the Bund-Ldnder-Streit (dispute between the
federal state and the states procedure) as a remedy to solve con-
flicts between the different levels within the German state by the
means of law and on basis of the constitution itself. Similar to the
Organstreit, the FCC is regarded as an independent and impartial
watchdog to decide the delicate topics that might be affected by
federal dispute.
Admissibility
An application can be filed by the Federal or a Land Govern-
ment only, representing the federal state or the respective Bun-
desland.155 The application has to assert and substantiate the
152. See infra Part II(D)(4).
153. BASiC LAw Art. 93(1) no. 3, Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act]
[Law on the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, §§.13 no. 7; 68-70
(Ger.). See KLAUS SCHLAICH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, 67 - 75 (8th ed., 2010);
MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 103 - 109 (3d ed. 2010).
154. See supra Part II(A).
155. Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal
Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 68 (Ger.); MICHAEL SACHS,
VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 103 et seq. (3d ed. 2010).
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possibility of a violation of the applicant's rights and competencies
deriving from the Basic Law. 156 If the enforcement of federal law
by the states is concerned, there is a preliminary proceeding that
must take place in the Federal Council before a proceeding can be
brought before the FCC. 157 The Federal Government or a state
can ask the Bundesrat to decide if there have been deficiencies in
the execution of federal laws. After that, the decision of the Bun-
desrat can be appealed to the FCC, who will render a final deci-
sion about the adequacy of the enforcement of federal law by the




The practical meaning of the federal dispute procedure is some-
what limited. Most conflicts deal with legislation and the question
of competency to legislate. In that case, the procedures of judicial
review, discussed below, are more important as the competency of
the FCC is much broader.
D. The Judicial Review Proceedings
159
"So if a law be in opposition to the constitution... the court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the
case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If then the
courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution,




The judicial review proceedings, inspired by the United States
Constitution and the competencies of the United States Supreme
Court, enable the FCC to decide about the compatibility of a legal
norm with the German Constitution. Thereby, these constitution-
156. Gesetz uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal
Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, §§ 64, 69 (Ger.).
157. BASIc LAW Art. 84(4), Sentence 1.
158. Gesetz uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal
Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, §§ 64, 69 (Ger.).
159. See KLAUS SCHLAICH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 77 - 127 (8th ed. 2010).
160. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 at 178 (1803).
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al actions guarantee not only a peaceful solution of disputes but
also foster legal certainty and obedience to the law.
German law knows two types of remedies for legal review. First
is concrete judicial review, which is open to courts only and driven
by the need to decide a concrete question in conformity with the
constitution. Second is abstract judicial review, which enables the
examination of a law irrespective of whether a concrete case has to
be decided. Even though the effects of the decision are the
same, 161 the prerequisites vary significantly what justifies a sepa-
rate discussion of concrete judicial review 162 and abstract judicial
review.163
2. Concrete Judicial Review 64
Rationale
Every branch of government is bound by the constitution. 165 Ac-
cordingly, the courts cannot be expected to apply ordinary law
they consider to be unconstitutional. Yet, whereas the courts are
entitled to interpret the constitution and to ask whether ordinary
law is in conformity with it, they are not competent to take the
consequences if the answer is in the negative. Instead, the courts
have to refer the question to the FCC for a final answer. Hence,
the proceeding of concrete judicial review can be seen as a com-
promise between all courts being bound by the constitution and
the FCC having the final say on constitutional interpretation.
This serves the paramount interest in safeguarding the primacy of
the constitution and preventing its violation. Furthermore, the
monopoly of the FCC to decide averts the risk of a fragmentation
in the application of ordinary law and ensures respect for the leg-
islative branch, which finally guarantees legal certainty. 166
161. See infra Part III(D)(4).
162. See infra Part III(D)(2).
163. See infra Part III(D)(3).
164. BASIC LAW Art. 93(1), no. 5; BASIC LAW Art. 100(1); Gesetz iiber das Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at
243, § 13, no. lrn 80-82 (Ger.). See MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 59 - 76
(3d ed. 2010).
165. BASIC LAW Art. 1(3).
166. For a discussion by the FCC itself, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Mar. 20, 1952, 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 184 (195 et seq.).
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Admissibility
Every court that concludes that a law on whose validity its deci-
sion depends violates the Basic Law may stay the proceedings and
refer that question to the FCC. The term "court" includes every
public legal entity that is established by the law to decide a dis-
pute by the means of law in an impartial and independent man-
ner. Private arbitrational courts and courts of religious communi-
ties exercising their right to self-government are not entitled to
ask for a decision of the FCC, neither may administrative bodies.
The object of the proceedings is a statutory norm that has been
generated in the legislative procedure provided for by the constitu-
tion (formelles Gesetz is known as the law in a formal sense)167 and
after the Basic Law entered into force (nachkonstitutionelles Ge-
setz).168 On the federal level this means a law that has been
adopted by the Bundestag.169 Even laws that amend the constitu-
tion and have been adopted with a two-thirds majority by the par-
liament and the Bundesrat, thus having a constitutional character
themselves, can be reviewed by the FCC. The court, thereby, ac-
cepts the idea of "unconstitutional" constitutional law. 170 The re-
striction to laws in the formal sense is not indicated by the word-
ing of Article 100 (1) of the Basic Law, but follows from the consti-
tutionally deduced interest in respecting the parliament and its
decisions. Law below the status of an act of parliament, such as
an administrative (delegated) law, may be dismissed by any court.
Whether the FCC has the authority to review law emanating from
the EU is controversial and will be discussed later.
171
The benchmark for the review of federal law is the Basic Law.
72
The referring court must be convinced that the statute in question
violates the constitution - doubts do not suffice. If the court con-
siders itself able to interpret a norm in conformity with the consti-
167. Id. at 201.
168. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 24, 1953, 2
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 124 (128); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 9, 1955, 4 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGEl 331 (339).
169. BAsic LAW Art. 77.
170. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 3,
2004, 109 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 279 (on covert
surveillance).
171. See infra Part IV(D)(3).




tution (verfassungskonforme Auslegung), the conviction require-
ment is not met.
However, should an ordinary court finally come to the conclu-
sion that a norm is unconstitutional; it is under the duty to refer
the question to the FCC 173 if its decision in a concrete case actually
depends on the decision of the FCC about the constitutionality of
the norm to be applied. 174 This requisite has two conditions.
First, the decision has to be a decision of a court exercising func-
tions of adjudication and finalizing the proceeding in question.
Second, the decision has to depend on the answer of the FCC
about the compatibility of the norm with the Basic Law. This is
only the case, if the outcome of the proceeding would be different
in legal and practical terms, if the norm in question is declared
invalid by the FCC. 75 Even though the opinion of the referring
court is determinative, the FCC might examine whether it is ten-
able. Accordingly, within constitutional litigation, the taking of
evidence might become necessary. Should a national court consid-
er a law to be incompatible with the Basic Law and EU law, it is
within the discretion of the court to determine if it should refer
the question to the ECJ in accordance with Article 267 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) or to refer such issue
to the FCC. This discretion is not only accepted by EU law; in or-
der to ensure the primacy of EU law, the ECJ stresses that a court
cannot be deprived from its competence "to refer to the Court of
Justice for a preliminary ruling any question that it considers
necessary, at whatever stage of the proceedings it considers ap-
propriate, even at the end of an interlocutory procedure for the
review of constitutionality."1 76 Accordingly, and to safeguard the
effectiveness of EU law as well as the right of every court under
Article 267 of the TFEU, the law of EU member states may not
compel national courts to give priority to the decision of national
constitutional courts about the compatibility of a norm with their
respective constitution.
A pending proceeding concerning the norm in question before
the FCC does not make an application inadmissible. Should the
FCC have dismissed the norm already, though, the reference is
173. BASIC LAW Art. 100; Gesetz Uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on
the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 80(1) (Ger.).
174. Compare Gesetz Uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal
Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 80(2) (Ger.).
175. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 24, 1984,
66 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 100 (105).
176. Joined Cases C-188/10 & C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 2010 ECR 1-0000.
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inadmissible as the decision of the case cannot depend on the
norm.177 If the FCC has confirmed the compatibility of a norm
with the constitution - and there is a presumption for the con-
formity of an act of parliament with the Basic Law 178 - the final
effect of the judgment is opposed to a new referral. Among other
exemptions, a new reference is admissible if the legal or factual
foundations of the judgment have changed. 79 In any case, the
requirements established by the FCC to substantiate and justify
the reference are high: the court has to analyze the jurisprudence
and literature exhaustively and discuss the validity of the norm in
question on that basis. Concerns and objections raised have to be
discussed from all different angles.
180
Relevance
The proceeding of concrete legal review is, just after constitu-
tional complaint, the most important constitutional remedy in to-
tal numbers and guarantees that all branches of government in
Germany are effectively dedicated to the rule of law. However,
due to the high requirements of justification and substantiation,
most references fail. To address the huge amount of references,
the inadmissibility can, in some cases, be declared by an unani-
mous decision of a chamber, thereby reducing the work amount for
the senates and accelerating the duration of the proceeding.'
8 '
3. Abstract Judicial Review
8 2
Rationale
Germany is dedicated to the rule of law. As an emanation of
that, the German constitution enjoys supremacy over ordinary
federal and all land law. Whereas in the proceeding of concrete
judicial review the decision of a court depends on the constitution-
177. See infra Part III(D)(4) (for the effect of § 31(2) of the FCC Act).
178. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 7, 1953, 2
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 266 (282).
179. MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT, 71 et seq. (3d ed. 2010).
180. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 17, 1978,
47 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 109 (114 et seq.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sep. 22, 2009, 124
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 251 (261).
181. Gesetz uiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 81a (Ger.).
182. BAsic LAw Art. 93(1), no. 2; Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act]
[Law on the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 13, no. 6, 76-79
(Ger.); See MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 37 - 53 (3d ed. 2010).
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ality of a norm, abstract judicial review enables the FCC to rule on
the conformity of ordinary law with the Basic Law, even though
an actual and concrete dispute is lacking and no applicant is di-
rectly affected by the potential violation of the Basic Law. This is
evidence of the objective interest in avoiding any breach of the
constitution and thereby guaranteeing the integrity of the consti-
tutional legal order in Germany. Accordingly, no individual inter-
est or right has to be invoked to challenge the law. The procedure
of abstract judicial review is of interest in particular for the politi-
cal minority in the Bundestag. It can challenge an unwanted act of
parliament adopted by the majority by calling it unconstitutional.
Admissibility
An application can be filed by the Federal Government, a Land
Government, and a quarter of the members of the Bundestag.
18 3
The quorum of the necessary amount of Bundestag members has
been lowered from one-third to a quarter in order to increase par-
liamentary involvement in issues concerning European Integra-
tion.184 Even though the proceeding serves the interest of consti-
tutional integrity, the number of applicants is restricted to federal
or land constitutional organs in order to prevent the legislature
from being permanently under attack, which would exhaust the
capacities of the FCC.
Justifications for the application can be disagreements or doubts
concerning the formal or substantive compatibility of federal or
land law with the Basic Law. Concretizing those requirements,
Section 76 of the FCC Act demands, first that the applicant re-
gards the norm in question to be null and void or, second, that the
applicant regards it to be valid if a federal or land organ has re-
jected to apply it, presuming it to be unconstitutional. This
amounts to a quite reluctant understanding of Article 93 (1), no. 2
of the Basic Law, as that constitutional provision declares mere
"doubts" to be sufficient for an application. However, in case of
conflict, the constitution trumps ordinary law so that even doubts
would be sufficient as long as the question for review is not hypo-
thetical.
In contrast to the concrete review proceeding, the object of ab-
stract review can be any federal or land law ranging from federal
183. Gesetz uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 76(1) (Ger.).
184. Bundestags-Drucksache (printed paper of the Bundestag), no. 16/8488, 2.
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constitutional law to even administrative (delegated) law at the
land or municipal level. There is no restriction to law in a formal
sense, i.e. acts of parliament. The intention of abstract judicial
review is to comprehensively guarantee a constitutional status in
Germany. According to the jurisprudence of the FCC, even the
constitutional legislature - which is a two-thirds majority in par-
liament and the Federal Council - is bound by the constitution
and the court itself competent to review constitutional amend-
ments. Bearing in mind that Article 79 (3) of the Basic Law con-
tains some "eternal" constitutional principles, protected even from
constitutional amendments, the claim for jurisdiction by the court
is at least open to vindication. Admittedly, the strong hurdles of a
two-thirds majority might be a safeguard against the constitution
being amended too easily, but that procedural protection clause
cannot ensure that the fundamental underpinnings might not be
affected. As the Basic Law entrusts the FCC with the task of be-
ing the constitutional defender, the assumption that the constitu-
tional status quo is protected by that task can be justified. Even
though this would lead to a severe restriction of the democratic
principle - after all, two-thirds of the democratically legitimized
representatives support the amendment - this principle is coun-
terbalanced by the rule of law being an essential element of con-
stitutionalism as well. Germany's historic experience has proven
that, for the worst case, there shall be an emergency break to pro-
tect the constitutional cornerstones from interference. Admitted-
ly, in a situation where a two-thirds majority intends to violate
the fundamental norms of the Basic Law, the political circum-
stances would not spark hope that a ruling of the FCC could pre-
vent an overthrow of the German constitutional state. In cases
where the constitutional infringement is less obvious, though, and
where the intention of a constitutional breach is lacking, the re-
view competence of the FCC might grant a neutral checkpoint and
an offer for trustful cooperation among the constitutional organs.
Only existing law can be reviewed; 8 5 there is no preventive ab-
stract judicial review with an important exemption concerning
acts sanctioning international treaties:8 6 As Germany would be
185. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 14, 1959, 10
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 20 (54).
186. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 30, 1952, 1
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 396 (413 et seq.) (Ger.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 31, 1971, 31
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (15).
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bound by the treaty after it has been ratified by the Federal Presi-
dent and irrespective of the validity of the domestic sanctioning
act,187 the FCC accepts a constitutional action against that act
even before it has become binding. The President, in those cases,
stays the ratification to enable the FCC rendering a decision on
that question. The FCC has recently stated in its Lissabon deci-
sion that Germany's instrument of ratification may not be depos-
ited until the necessary amendments and legal alterations have
entered into force.
188
According to supremacy, EU law cannot be reviewed under do-
mestic law including constitutional law. Still, there is a dispute
between the FCC and the ECJ whether in some exceptional cases
the FCC is entitled to pick up a case and decide if the constitu-
tional foundations of European integration under German law
have been violated. This will be addressed more comprehensively
later in Section IV(D)(3). Additionally, domestic law to implement
EU law is covered by the supremacy of EU law as far as EU law
does not leave discretion for the member states.'8 9
The entire Basic Law is the benchmark for review as far as fed-
eral law is concerned; land law, however, can be reviewed on the
basis of all federal law. As, according to Article 25, Sentence 2 of
the Basic Law, the general rules of public international law enjoy
a status above other federal law, there is much persuasive power
in accepting the FCC competency to review on the basis of those
rules as well. 90
There is no time limit for abstract judicial review but as an un-
written requirement the FCC asks for an objective interest in clar-
ifying (objektives Klarstellungsinteresse) whether the disputed
norm is constitutional.' 91 Such an interest is only lacking if the
187. Vienna Convetion on the Law of Treaties Art. 26 - 27, 46, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
188. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 30, 2009,
123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 267 (339 et seq.).
189. MICHAEL LYSANDER FREMUTH, DIE EUROPISCHE UNION AUF DEM WEG IN DIE
SUPRANATIONALITAT, 140 et seq., (2010) (as an emanation of the principle of supremacy it
might be called "indirect primacy" (indirekter Vorrang)). See also Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 2, 2010, 125 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 260 (306 et seq.) (the indirect primacy of
EU law has quite recently been explicitly recognized by the FCC).
190. MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 44 (3d ed. 2010).
191. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 23, 1957, 6
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 104 (110); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 88
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 203 (334).
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norm does not have any further impact. 192 It is, however, still un-
clear whether the applicant has to show a personal and individual
interest in the clarification of the constitutionality. As the Basic
Law itself does not lay down such a requirement, a subjective in-




Abstract judicial review is an important means of the political
opposition to protect the rights and competencies of the Bundes-
tag. Critics argue that this might be an incentive to challenge a
political defeat by the means of law and the courts. Yet, that as-
sumption is not confirmed by practice: only two proceedings in
2009 were initiated.
4. The Decision of the FCC in Review Procedures
The Content of the Decision - A Tiered Approach
In cases of concrete judicial review, the FCC only decides on the
law, meaning it does not decide the case pending before the refer-
ring court. 194 The nature of the concrete judicial review procedure
is therefore an interim procedure - it is the referring court that
has to make a decision to conclude the stayed proceeding after the
FCC's decision.
The FCC's decision can have the same content in both types of
review proceedings (abstract and concrete). As a rule established
by Section 78, Sentence 1 of the FCC Act, the FCC is asked to de-
clare an unconstitutional law to be null and void. This declaration
has ex tunc-effect 95 and can be confined to parts of the norm in
192. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 18, 2005,
113 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 167 (167); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan 15, 2008, 119
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 394 (409 et seq.).
193. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 22, 1953, 2
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 213 (217); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 24, 2003, 108
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 169 (178).
194. Gesetz Ober das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 81 (Ger.).
195. HERBERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 78, para. 7 (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu /
Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds., 2010)
374 Vol. 49
Patchwork Constitutionalism
question 196 as well as to a specific interpretation of that law. 197 In
the latter case, the FCC itself declares which interpretation of a
norm would be in violation of the constitution. However, to de-
clare a norm to be null and void, might even deepen an unconsti-
tutional situation. To avoid this consequence, the court began
quite early to define its competency differently. Instead of declar-
ing a norm to be null and void, the court regards itself competent
to confine itself to merely declare a norm to be compatible or in-
compatible with the Basic Law. 198 This competency has mean-
while been confirmed, some argue legalized 99 by Section 31 (2),
Sentence 2 of the FCC Act. Declaring a norm to be compatible
with the Basic Law allows for legal clarity and helps avoid further
conflicts. In some cases, the FCC specifies which interpretation of
the law is constitutional so that the confirmation of a norm in-
cludes the rejection of the same norm for different forms of inter-
pretation. 200
Declaring a norm to be incompatible without declaring it null
and void enables the further application of the norm to prevent
the absence of any legal norm. The rationale behind this is that
the absence of a norm could lead to a situation to be even in deep-
er breach of the constitution. This might be in the case where a
norm belonging to criminal law is in breach of the constitution -
its invalidation could prevent perpetrators of even severe crimes
from being punished. Furthermore, a norm that grants benefits to
a group of people, but, in breach of the equality principle, not to
another group of people, should not be invalidated. Otherwise, no
one would be granted any benefits, as the breach of equality could
neither be healed nor settled by denying any benefits in conse-
quence of the annulment. However, one has to bear in mind that
the norm is unconstitutional and that keeping such a norm in
force raises severe problems in a state dedicated to the rule of law.
196. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 12, 1958, 8
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 274 (301); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 2, 1999, 100
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 249 (262).
197. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 14, 2007,
118 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 212 (234).
198. HERBERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 78, para. 35, 66 et seq. (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-
Bleibtreu / Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds., 2010).
199. MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 49 (3d ed. 2010).
200. HERBERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 78, para. 95 et seq. (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-
Bleibtreu / Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds., 2010).
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To counterbalance the conflicting interests, i.e. to dispose of an
unconstitutional norm while avoiding a situation provoking even
more severe constitutional doubts, the FCC may decide under
which conditions a norm may be applied for a specific period of
time. This authoritative interpretation and delineation is com-
bined with an order for the legislative branch to amend the law in
conformity with the constitution as concretized by the court. In-
terpretation in conformity with the constitution (verfassungskon-
forme Auslegung) seems to be the solution of the conflict described
above. Indeed, deciding about the scope and content of the norm
by an authoritative interpretation (having the force of law under
Section 31 (2) of the FCC Act) permits the court to intervene in the
legislative branch. However, as the legislature is free to amend
the law, interpretation instead of invalidation shows more respect
for the will of the legislature, even though a decision about the
ratio legis might amount to an act of creation rather than inter-
pretation. Finally, the FCC can, respecting the margin of appreci-
ation of the legislature, decide that a norm is currently in con-
formity with the Basic Law but that, due to remaining doubts, the
assumption of the legislature has to be rechecked and proven in a
timely manner. In a recent decision, the court overruled a norm
after which a father's custody of his child depended on the consent
of the mother. It stated that the presumption that a mother would
always decide in the best interest of the child was not proven to be
adequate.
201
The Decision Having the Force of Law
All decisions of the FCC shall be binding upon federal and land
constitutional organs as well as on all courts and authorities. 20 2
Decisions about the validity of legal norms, however, are ordered
to have the force of law. 20 3 According to this provision, that has
been discussed in-depth above, the decision is binding inter et erga
omnes, which means the force of law extends the binding force to
everyone, including private persons. It not only covers the con-
crete decision and the operative provisions of the judgment, but
also its supporting reasoning. The court itself, though, is not
bound but free to alter its future jurisdiction.
201. BVerfG, 1 BvR 420/09, 21.07.2010, paras. 59 et seq. (referring to new empirical
findings).
202. Gesetz uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 31(1) (Ger.).
203. Id. at § 31(2).
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The Impact of the FCC's Decision on Final Decisions of other
Courts
As a general rule, final decisions based on a norm that has been
declared incompatible with the Basic Law or null and void remain
unaffected. 20 4 Nullification may not be asked for, as the interest
in legal certainty prevails. Yet, there is no conflict with that in-
terest for future times, so that final decisions shall not be execut-
ed.205 An important exemption is made for final decisions in crimi-
nal proceedings as they create a unique burden containing a
strong social condemnation. According to Section 79 (1) of the
FCC Act, new proceedings may be initiated against convictions
based on a norm that has been declared null and void or incompat-
ible with the Basic Law.
E. Constitutional Remedies to Defend the Constitution and the
Rule of Law
In German history, several attempts have been made to create a
state on a democratic basis dedicating it to the rule of law.
Whereas the Paulskirchenverfassung (1849) never entered into
force, the Constitution of Weimar (1919) after the First World War
constituted the first democratic German state. However, democ-
racy and the rule of law had not been implemented in the mind of
the people. As the Constitution of Weimar was a weak constitu-
tion - it hardly contained provisions to protect itself against anti-
democratic forces and the human rights enshrined were not ac-
companied by procedural enforcement measures - it did not re-
quire huge efforts of the Nationalsozialisten to overthrow it.
Though the Constitution of Weimar was not officially abolished, in
fact, it was totally undermined and lost any of its meaning after
the Nationalsozialisten grasped power in 1933. After the atroci-
ties and the reign of terror under the Third Empire (Drittes
Reich), the framers of the Basic Law made the decision in favor of
a powerful democratic model able to defend itself against its ene-
mies (wehrhafte Demokratie). The procedures to ban political par-
ties and concerning the forfeiture of basic rights are evidence of
the idea of a strong democracy and the interest in defending the
rule of law.
204. Id. at § 79(2), Sentence 1.
205. Id. at § 79(2), Sentence 2.
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1. Forfeiture of Basic Rights20 6
"Whatever is my right as a man, is also the right of another;
and it becomes my duty to guarantee, as well as to possess."
20 7
Rationale
Basic rights are directed against the state and increasingly
against public authority on a supranational level in order to pro-
tect the individual from unjustified public interference in his/her
individual sphere. From a dogmatic point of view, basic rights are
not directed against private persons. However, the mutual respect
for your counterpart and his/her basic rights is the very basis of
every society. Furthermore, the modern state is less a Leviathan
but has become a defender of human rights. For that reason, and
to protect the state from endeavors intending to abolish it, the
misuse of human rights to combat the constitution and the free
democratic order has to be fought. The procedure for the forfei-
ture of human rights offers a means to solve the problem while
respecting the rule of law.
Admissibility and the FCC's Decision
The forfeiture of basic rights procedure is a contradictory pro-
ceeding. Accordingly, after an application has been filed by the
parliament, the Federal or a Land Government 208 enjoys political
discretion whether to initiate such a proceeding. The opposing
party is given the opportunity to make a statement regarding the
accusations. 2 9 The procedure can be directed against any person
entitled to those basic rights that might be forfeited under Article
18 of the Basic Law, i.e. against individuals as well as legal per-
sons. After that preliminary proceeding, the FCC has to decide if
the main proceeding is admissible, sufficiently founded or whether
it has to be held. Therefore, the court might order a preliminary
examination as well as take evidence. 210 To guarantee an impar-
206. BASIC LAW Art. 18, § 13, no. 1; Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC
Act] [Law on the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, §§ 36-41
(Ger.); MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 117 - 120 (3d ed. 2010).
207. THOMAS PAIN, RIGHTS OF MAN 165 (2008).
208. Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 36 (Ger.).
209. Id. at § 37.
210. Id. at § 38.
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tial and independent decision avoiding political power games, the
FCC is entrusted with the monopoly to decide about the forfeiture.
If the application is founded, the court declares which basic
rights (and to what amount and extent) are forfeited. 211 In order
to be proportionate, though, that declaration requires a concrete
and real threat to the constitutional order. The forfeiture might
be limited to a specific period of time, being at least one year.
212
The FCC may further deny the opposing party the right to vote
and to be elected as well as the capacity to hold public office. In
the case of corporate bodies, the court may direct that they are to
be dissolved. 213 This decision forms the legal basis for administra-
tive authorities to take actions against the opposing party. 214 The
person concerned is deprived of the protection of those rights for
the period of time mentioned in the decision. Measures taken
against the individual cannot be reviewed on the basis of the for-
feited basic rights. The guarantee of human dignity and other
fundamental principles, like the rule of law and the need for an
act of parliament for severe restrictions of human rights, must
never be violated. A review of the decision can only be asked for if
the forfeiture is not limited in time or ordered for more than one
year.215 If the court has already made a decision, a further appli-
cation has to be based on new facts that emerged after the first
decision in order to protect its legal force.
216
Relevance
The forfeiture of basic rights has not obtained relevance so far
as the rare attempts that have been made never led to a decision
on the merits. The value of this proceeding seems to be its mere
existence as a signal to the enemies of the constitution. Further-
more, it demonstrates that Germany has learnt its lessons from
the past and is, actually, willing to protect the constitution against
its enemies.
211. Id. at § 41 (1).
212. Id. at § 40.
213. Gesetz Uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 39 (2) (Ger.).
214. Id. at § 39 (1).
215. Id. at § 40.
216. Id. at § 41.
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2. Procedure for Banning Political Parties217
"Political parties who use the means of democracy to abolish
democracy shall be barred from the political life. 218
Rationale
As mentioned, political parties enjoy a special status under
German constitutional law and they are regarded to be of utmost
importance for forming the political will of the people. As a consti-
tutional institution2 9 they play a major role in the political life in
Germany. 220 However, it is easy to imagine that parties and their
privileges 221 may be used to undermine or abolish the free demo-
cratic constitutional structure or to endanger the existence of the
Federal Republic of Germany. While the forfeiture of basic rights
procedure provides for a means directed against individuals com-
bating the free and democratic order, the banning of political par-
ties procedure, which is admissible besides the forfeiture proce-
dure, 222 is intended to challenge the institutional and organized
attempt to overthrow the state and its fundamental values. As a
response to the weakness of the Constitution of Weimar that had
no sufficient defense against the NSDAP (the Nazi party), democ-
racy shall no longer accept that its enemies misuse its freedoms
and guarantees.
Yet, an open and liberal state depends on a pluralistic debate
and the competition of ideas and beliefs. Therefore, a critical
comment about the constitution cannot be sufficient for banning a
party. Furthermore, it shall not be the responsibility of other par-
ties or the administrative branches, which are often dominated by
the leading political majority, to decide about the prohibition. Ac-
217. BASIC LAW Art. 21(2); Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law
on the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 13, no.2 43-47 (Ger.);
see also MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 121 - 124 (3d ed. 2010).
218. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 23, 1952, 2
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (11).
219. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 12, 1960,
11 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 266 (273); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 19, 1966, 20
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 56 (100).
220. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Aug. 17, 1956, 5
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 85 (133).
221. Compare JORN IPSEN, GRUNDGESETz - KOMMENTAR, Art. 21, para. 15 et seq., (Mi-
chael Sachs ed., 5th ed. 2009).
222. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 23, 1952, 2
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (75).
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cordingly, it is again the neutral FCC that is asked to decide about
the banning of political parties.
Admissibility and Decision
The proceeding might be initiated by the Bundestag, the Bun-
desrat or the Federal Government. 223 A Land Government can file
an application if the party assumed to be unconstitutional is con-
fined to the territory of that respective state.224 It is up to those
applicants to decide if they want to combat an unconstitutional
party by political means or if it shall be prohibited by the FCC.
Only political parties can be potential respondents, while other
associations (Vereine) can be prohibited by administrative deci-
sions. Due to the higher level of protection, the qualification as
political party is important and at the same time controversial.
225
Like in the forfeiture procedure, in a preliminary proceeding, the
FCC has to decide if the main proceeding is admissible, sufficient-
ly founded or whether it has to be held.226 The FCC is entitled to
order a seizure as well as preliminary examination. 227 However, if
a decision has already been taken, another application has to be
based on new facts.2
28
Talking about the merits, the Basic Law neither asks for gen-
eral acceptance nor does it intend to prevent controversial discus-
sions about constitutional questions. Therefore, parties might
criticize, question or even be opposed to the constitution. Only if
they combat the constitutional order in an aggressive and militant
manner, they can be banned.229 If the application is founded in
such a case, the FCC, requiring a two-thirds majority according to
Section 15 (4), Sentence 1 of the FCC Act, declares the party to be
unconstitutional. 230 This shall be accompanied by the dissolution
of the party and the prohibition to establish substitute organiza-
223. Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 43(1) (Ger.).
224. Id. at § 43(2).
225. Compare JORN IPSEN, GRUNDGESETZ - KOMMENTAR, Art. 21, para. 17 et seq., (Mi-
chael Sachs ed., 5th ed. 2009).
226. Gesetz fiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 45 (Ger.).
227. Id. at §§ 47, 38.
228. Id. at §§ 41, 47.
229. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Aug. 17, 1956, 5
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 85 (141).
230. Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal
Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 46(1) (Ger.).
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tions.231 The court can further direct the confiscation of the par-
ty's property for the public benefit.23 2 According to Section 46 (1),
no. 4 and (4) Bundeswahlgesetz (Federal Election Act), members of
a prohibited party lose their membership in the Bundestag. These
consequences guarantee that an unconstitutional party can actu-
ally be entirely eliminated from the political scene.
Relevance
As mentioned, only the FCC is competent to declare a party un-
constitutional with a two-thirds majority vote. Before such a deci-
sion can be made, no administrative measures may be based on
the assumption according to which the party is unconstitutional.
This protection derived from the monopoly of the FCC to decide
about the prohibition of a party is called "party privilege" and dis-
tinguishes political parties from any other association that can be
prohibited by administrative decision. In the past, only two par-
ties have been banned: the "Sozialistische Reichspartei" (Socialist
Empire Party) and the 'Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands"
(German Communist Party). A recent attempt to prohibit the
"Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands" (NPD) failed in
2003 when the FCC declared the application to be inadmissible as
the management of the party was strongly influenced by state
agents or people cooperating with German intelligence. 233 This
influence of the German state even during the pending proceeding
runs counter to the "Staatsfreiheit" (freedom from the state) of po-
litical parties. The state is not allowed to infiltrate parties while
at the same calling for their prohibition.
However, when it comes to the removal of civil servants, the
threshold is much lower. As those holding a public office repre-
sent the state and its legal order, and thus have to identify them-
selves with the constitution, being a member to a party question-
ing the constitution is sufficient for removal even though the be-
havior of the person concerned is not hostile and aggressive to-
wards the constitution. 234
231. Id. at § 46(2), Sentence 1.
232. Id. at § 46(2), Sentence 3.
233. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 18, 2003,
107 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 339 (360).
234. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 22, 1975,




There are further proceedings, though of minor practical im-
portance, reserved for the FCC to defend the constitutional order
and the rule of law.
The FCC is competent to rule on a motion for impeachment of
the Federal President if he/she has willfully violated the constitu-
tion or federal law. 235 That action has never been used thus far,
which is probably a consequence of the mostly ceremonial func-
tions of the President. However, it grants a possibility to hold a
President responsible who does not comply, for instance, with a
judgment of the FCC that orders him/her to write out a law he/she
regards to be unconstitutional.
To protect the independence of the judicial branch while guar-
anteeing that judges do not misuse their special status for uncon-
stitutional activities, the FCC is further entrusted to decide on the
impeachment of federal and land judges that infringe the princi-
ples of the Basic Law or a land constitution.
236
Eventually, the FCC has the final say on the validity of elec-
tions to the Bundestag.237 The parliament itself is responsible for
first scrutiny of the election and for the decision if one of its mem-
bers has lost his/her seat. The decision of the Bundestag, howev-
er, can be challenged before the FCC by the member concerned, a
person entitled to vote whose prior objection to the Bundestag has
been rejected, provided that he/she is supported by at least one-
hundred persons entitled to vote, a parliamentary group or a mi-
nority in the Bundestag comprising at least one-tenth of the statu-
tory number of all members. As the procedure is supposed to en-
sure the correct and constitutional composition of the parlia-
ment, 238 rather than protecting individual rights, the claim is only
235. BASIC LAW Art. 61; Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on
the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 13, no. 4, 49-57 (Ger.).
See also MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 124 - 126 (3d ed. 2010).
236. BASIC LAW Art. 98(2), (5); Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act]
[Law on the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 13, no. 9, 58 - 62
(Ger.). See also, MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 126 - 128 (3d ed., 2010).
237. BASIC LAW Art. 41; Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on
the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 13, no. 3, 48. See also
MICHAEL SACHS, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 129 - 133 (3d ed. 2010).
238. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 18, 1952, 1
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 430 (433); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 5, 2000, 103
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 111 (134); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 2009, 122
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 304 (305).
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successful if a proven violation of the election principles has an





Constitutional complaint is the most important constitutional
remedy in total numbers and with regard to its meaning in Ger-
many's constitutional history. For the first time, 241 individuals
and (private) legal persons were endowed with the means to en-
force their basic rights granted to them by the federal constitution.
Constitutional complaint as the procedural counterpart of basic
rights constitutes an important improvement compared to the sit-
uation under the Constitution of Weimar, which did not provide
for procedural means to enforce the rights enshrined. However,
that individual remedy was not originally enshrined in the Basic
Law. 242 The framers discussed individual constitutional remedies,
but fearing an excess of judicial control and activism, they re-
frained from inserting constitutional complaint into the constitu-
tion. That remedy was first established by the FCC Act in 1951
(being a sufficient legal basis for the jurisdiction of the FCC); the
Basic Law was amended some twenty years later in 1969. Nowa-
days, it is controversially discussed whether that remedy forms
part of the constitutional core guarantees of the Basic Law, pre-
venting its abolishment. 243 Due to the success of constitutional
complaint, that discussion seems rather hypothetical. However, it
239. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 25, 1967, 22
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 277 (280); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 1, 1973, 34 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 202 (203); Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 2009, 122 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 304 (306); MICHAEL SACHS,
VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 131 (3d ed. 2010).
240. BASIC LAW Art. 93(1), no.4; Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act]
[Law on the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 13, no. 8a, 90 -
95 (Ger.). See also KLAUS SCHLAICH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 128 - 205 (8th ed.,
2010).
241. There are predecessors of constitutional complaint in German history, but they fall
short of the level of protection granted by constitutional complaint under the Basic Law.
Compare KLAUS SCHLACH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 129 (8th ed. 2010).
242. SABINE HAIN, DIE INDIVIDUALVERFASSUNGSBESCHWERDE NACH BUNDESRECHT 46 et
seq. (2002).
243. According to Michael Kloepfer, constitutional complaint is not an indispensable
element for an adequate protection of basic rights, but is justified by legal and political




is important to mention that constitutional complaint is an ex-
traordinary and subsidiary remedy, 244 not entailing suspensory
effect. 245 As it intends to protect constitutional guarantees, consti-
tutional complaint does neither belong to the proceedings of the
ordinary courts as an additional remedy, nor does it prolong such
proceedings. 24
6
Constitutional complaint has a double-function: 247  Besides
providing individual legal protection, it serves the objective cross-
case interests in constitutional review, interpretation and devel-
opment,248 as well as an educational function. 249 Also in this re-
spect, constitutional complaint is a procedural counterpart of basic
rights as it does not only avouch individual guarantees, but also
constitutes an objective scale of values and fundamental decisions
(objektive Wertordnung).250 Accordingly, constitutional complaint
offers the FCC, triggered by individuals acting in their personal
interest, the possibility to review measures of public authority and
thereby to foster the objective values behind basic rights. Moreo-
ver, this makes basic rights visible and impels every state agent to
bear in mind that he/she is bound by it. Therefore, constitutional
complaint educates those acting in public capacity and prevents
basic rights from being ignored.
However, the success of constitutional complaint has a "disad-
vantage": the huge amount of work threatens to exceed the capa-
244. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 27, 1965,
18 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 315 (325); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht tBverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 10, 1978, 49
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 252 (258); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 8, 1985, 68 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 376 (379).
245. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 18, 1996,
93 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 381 (385); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 14, 1996, 94
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 166 (213, 215).
246. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 14, 1996,
94 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 166 (213).
247. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 28, 1972,
33 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 247 (258).
248. Id. at 258 et. seq.; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Mar. 7, 1990, 81 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE]
278 (290); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 19,
1991, 85 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 109 (113).
249. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 28, 1972,
33 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 247 (259). Compare
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 24, 2006, 116
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 24 (59).
250. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 22, 1951, 7
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 198 (205 et. seq.).
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bilities of the court. To address this overload, the FCC Act offers
two opportunities. First, and after the acceptance of the com-
plaint, the court can reject the application a limine, at the very
beginning of the procedure and without further justification, if the
complainant has been informed about the possibility before the
rejection and if the application is inadmissible or clearly and obvi-
ously unfounded. 251 Second, the court can reject the application
after a preliminary procedure of acceptance which has been estab-
lished and modified several times.252 According to Section 93a (1)
of the FCC Act, a constitutional complaint requires acceptance. A
system of chambers (each composed of three judges and assigned
to a senate under Section 15a of the FCC Act) has been set up to
decide about the acceptance without mandatory oral proceedings
and the necessity to give reasons for a refusal of the acceptance.
253
The chamber may reject the complaint by a decision that cannot
be appealed.254 If the question does not have fundamental consti-
tutional significance and the complaint is clearly justified, the
chamber can even allow the complaint.255 Such a decision in the
affirmative is equal to a decision by the senate, whereas a decision
about the validity of a legal norm having the force of law in the
sense of Section 31 (2) of the FCC Act is reserved for the senate.
256
Both decisions, rejecting or granting a constitutional complaint,
depend on an unanimous decision by the chamber. 257 If consensus
cannot be reached, i.e. if the chamber has neither rejected nor al-
lowed the complaint, the senate has to decide. Most of the com-
plaints that are filed, about ninety-seven percent, are finally dealt
with by chambers. Unlike the rejection a limine, the rejection by a
chamber within the acceptance procedure is not a decision on the
merits and thus does not entail binding force. Rather, the com-
plaint remains undecided. If, in contrast, a chamber allows a
complaint, that decision is on the merits and therefore entails
binding force.
251. Gesetz uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal
Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 24 (Ger).
252. On the history, see KLAUS SCHLAICH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 165 et seq.
(8th ed. 2010).
253. Gesetz uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal
Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 93d (Ger.).
254. Id. at § 93b (first alternative).
255. Id. at §§ 93c(1), 93a (2).
256. Id. at § 93c(3), Sentence 3.





A constitutional complaint can be filed by "any person. '258 As
that remedy is the procedural counterpart of the comprehensive
binding force of basic rights, the expression "any person" refers to
anyone who may invoke and practice the basic rights in question.
Generally, individuals and private legal persons are entitled to
basic rights. Some basic rights are granted to anyone under Ger-
man jurisdiction (human rights), whereas others are confined to
German nationals (citizen rights). Foreigners, in any case, are
protected by the general freedom of action under Article 2 (1) of
the Basic Law, though EU foreigners, due to EU citizenship and
the protection from discrimination, have to be equated with Ger-
man nationals.25 9 The question if the unborn child enjoys basic
rights or if there is only an objective obligation of the state to pro-
tect the human being in statu nascendi is as controversially dis-
cussed 260 as is the question of a basic rights-protection post mor-
tem. 261 Those topics are connected to the question of actionability,
i.e. the question if an individual is able to act by himself/herself
before the court, not depending on legal representation. According
to the FCC, there is no clear answer or date, but rather the ques-
tion posed is whether the complainant is able to reasonably exer-
cise and understand the basic right he/she invokes. 262 In that
case, he/she has the legal capacity to bring a case before the court.
With regard to legal persons, an answer has to be given if they, as
258. BASIC LAW Art. 94(1) no. 4a; Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act]
[Law on the Federal Constituional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 90 (1) (Ger.).
259. FRIEDHELM HUFEN, STAATSRECHT II - GRUNDRECHTE 87 (2d ed. 2009) (proposing a
broad interpretation of Art. 2(1) of the Basic Law, the general personal freedom).
260. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975,
39 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (36) (stating that
the unborn child enjoys the full protection of the right to live); Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 88 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 203 (251 et. seq.) (the court explicitly acknowl-
edged human dignity under Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law for the unborn child).
261. In 30 BVerfGE 173, the FCC recognized a post mortem-effect of human dignity
under Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law, though, generally with the demise of a person, the com-
plaint is settled as it tends to enforce personal rights. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 24, 1971, 30 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 173 (194). Relatives can only step in and con-
tinue the procedure if they pursue an interest of their own. Compare Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 3, 2004, 109 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 279 (304).
262. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 26, 1970,
28 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 243 (254 et. seq.).
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a legal person merging the interest of its members, can actually
enjoy and realize that basic right for the personal development
and fulfillment of the people behind. A broadcasting company, for
instance, can rely on the freedom of press and information but ob-
viously not on the right to life.
In contrast, the state, comprising all its emanations like subu-
nits, agents and even legal entities dominated by the state, is
bound by basic rights but not privileged by them.263 Thus, persons
acting in official capacity cannot invoke basic rights as far as their
official conduct is concerned, with an exemption for procedural
and judiciary basic rights.264 There are important exceptions,
though. Public broadcasting networks can invoke the freedom of
media 265 and universities may invoke the freedom to academic re-
search and teaching. 266 In those fields, the mentioned entities
might be exposed to state interference just like private persons.267
However, they are not entitled to other basic rights.268 Finally,
churches enjoy a special status under German law.269 The state is
neutral when it comes to religions, but religious organizations
might be granted a special status as public corporation (6ffentlich-
rechtliche Korperschaft). For that case, they are bound by basic
rights while at the same time enjoying all (applicable) basic
rights.27
0
263. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 8, 1982, 61
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 82 (100 et. seq.); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 14, 1987, 75
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 192 (200).
264. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 8, 1982, 61
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 82 (104).
265. BASIC LAW Art. 5(1), Sentence 2.
266. BASIC LAW Art. 5(3), Sentence 1.
267. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 16, 1963,
15 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 256 (262); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 27, 1971, 31
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 314 (322); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 8, 1982, 61 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 82 (104 et. seq.); Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 12, 2003, 107 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 299 (310); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 11, 2007, 119 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 181 (211).
268. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 13, 1982,
59 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 231 (255).
269. Compare BASIC LAW Art. 140; WEIMAR CONSTITUTION Art. 137(V).
270. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 4, 1965, 19
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 129 (132); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 2, 1967, 21 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 362 (374).
388 Vol. 49
Patchwork Constitutionalism
Object of the Complaint: Public Authority Act
As all branches of government are bound by basic rights,271 con-
stitutional complaints might be directed against any manifesta-
tion of public authority. To quote the FCC, "the rationale behind
the constitutional complaint is to make any act of legislative, ex-
ecutive or judicial authority reviewable with regard to its constitu-
tionality."272 In contrast, the general guarantee of recourse to the
courts against public authority according to Article 19 (4) of the
Basic Law is confined to executive measures violating a person's
rights.273 Basic rights, though, do not bind private persons. Ac-
cordingly, private conduct cannot directly be challenged with con-
stitutional complaint. However, as basic rights entail an impact
on the entire legal order (objektive Drittwirkung),274 the courts
have to consider and respect them when they interpret and apply
general clauses like the bona fide clause under Section 242 of the
Civil Code or the morality clause Section 138 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, a judgment can be challenged, raising the argument
that the court, judging the private conduct, has not complied with
that constitutional obligation.
Besides judgments, administrative and legislative conduct - an
action or an omission, 275 if a duty to act has allegedly been violated
- can be challenged. Yet, the hurdles to combat legislative acts
are quite high. First, the exhaustion of remedies and the principle
of subsidiarity have to be overcome (see below). Second, domestic
law adopted in order to implement EU law might be exempt from
judicial review by the FCC as a consequence of the primacy of su-
pranational law stemming from the EU.276 If a complaint against
a law is admissible, however, even acts of the constitutional legis-
lature may be subject to legal review. Basic rights as well as other
parts of the constitution might be changed by constitutional
amendment, but there are some fundamental elements that can-
271. BASiC LAW Art. 1(3).
272. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 198 (207).
273. EBERHARD SCHMIDT-ABMANN, GRUNDGESETZ - KOMMENTAR, Art. 19, paras. 45 et
seq., (Theodor Maunz / Guinter Diirig eds., 2010).
274. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 198 (205).
275. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 14, 1981,
56 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 54 (70).
276. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 16, 1963,
118 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 79 (95 et. seq.). See
also infra Part IV(D)(3).
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not be altered even by constitutional amendment. Besides the
protection of human dignity under Article 1 of the Basic Law, the
state principles like the rule of law, democracy, federalism and the
social state under Article 20 of the Basic Law, as well as the divi-
sion of Germany between the federal state and the Bundeslinder
are covered by the eternity clause of Article 79 (3) of the Basic
Law, which declares any deviation to be unconstitutional. As al-
ready explained, in those cases the FCC might examine the ques-
tion of "unconstitutional" constitutional law, i.e. constitutional
amendments that violate the inviolable principles of the basic law.
In general, constitutional complaints are directed against Ger-
man public authority including acts sanctioning international
treaties. This assumption is questioned by the process of Europe-
an integration. In the early days, the FCC denied the admissibil-
ity against public authority stemming from the European Com-
munity (EC) 277 (now the EU as its successor). In its famous deci-
sions Solange I and Maastricht, however, the court declared that
constitutional complaint is not only intended to protect against
German authority, but also against public authority having im-
pact within Germany. At least in theory, constitutional complaint
against European authority acts may be possible, thereby putting
them under the regime of the Basic Law and the control of the
FCC. This controversial topic shall be addressed in more detail
below in the context of European constitutionalism under Section
IV(D)(3).
Locus Standi (Legal Standing) and Continuing Legal Interest
in the Decision
The applicant has to prove a right to complain should his/her
remedy be admissible. Benchmarks for the decision are basic
rights according to Articles 1 through 19 of the Basic Law as well
as those rights equated with them by Article 93 (1), no. 4a. Even
though the FCC utilizes the entire constitution for judicial review,
the applicant has to invoke one of those rights. He/she may not
merely resort to constitutional principles or international human
rights. However, if possible, the applicant can invoke them in con-
junction with a basic right. The FCC has acknowledged this op-
portunity even for human rights enshrined in the ECHR, stating
that they form part of the rule of law and bind any court in Ger-
277. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 18, 1967,
22 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 293 (295).
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many interpreting and applying the law including basic rights. 27
However, the FCC is not entitled to apply those rights directly;
especially EU human rights cannot be defended by constitutional
complaint.
In order to avoid popular action, the applicant has to bring for-
ward and substantiate279 the possibility of a violation in those
basic rights he/she invokes. 2 0 The violation might be an action
restricting his/her rights or an omission in cases of a duty to act.
28 1
He/she fails if a violation can be a priori and patently excluded,
e.g. if the applicant is not protected by the basic right or trans-
cends the scope of protection, if the right is not enumerated as a
federal right (like the violation of election principles of the Bun-
deslainder) or if the authority act does not amount to a restriction,
e.g. in case of a merely preliminary measure without a current
impact on the legal sphere. Considering that the final decision
about the violation is a question of the merits, the actual in-
fringement of basic rights does not have to be obviously justified
for the admissibility of constitutional complaint.
28 2
The major test to pass is whether the applicant can prove a cur-
rent, direct and individual violation by the public authority act in
question.2 3 Constitutional complaint is not supposed to address
abstract questions of law, accordingly, there has to be an actual
restriction. A restriction without any further present impact, as
278. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 14, 2004,
111 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 307 (315 et. seq.).
279. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993,
89 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155 (171).
280. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 20, 1979,
53 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 30 (48); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 18, 1982, 60
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 360 (370); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 24, 1993, 88
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 384 (399 et seq.); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 19, 2000, 102
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 196 (206 et. seq.); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 15, 2006, 115
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 118 (137).
281. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 29, 1987,
77 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 170 (214).
282. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 29, 1987,
77 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 170 (220).
283. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 20, 1979,
53 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 30 (48); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. May 18, 1982, 60
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 360 (369 et seq.); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 19, 2000, 102
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 196 (206 et. seq.).
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well as an expected restriction in future times, cannot be chal-
lenged. Yet, if a future impact is beyond doubt and if there is a
determination of the current behavior of people, this may suffice
for a current restriction. 284 Furthermore, the applicant can only
challenge a measure that directly intervenes in his/her legal
sphere. In case a measure depends on enforcement, that act is the
real restriction imposed on the applicant. Before the enforcement,
a measure of restriction is missing. Finally, and as mentioned
above, constitutional complaint is an individual remedy. To avoid
popular action, it may only be filed by an applicant to defend
his/her own rights, unless there is a provision allowing for repre-
sentative action. However, it is not only the formal addressee who
can be individually affected (those cases do not cause major prob-
lems) but anyone who is restricted in his/her legal sphere by the
impact of a public authority act can challenge that act, e.g. the
wife of a husband who shall be expelled. 2
85
The possibility of a violation varies depending on the act in
question. In case the action is directed against administrative
acts, the obvious-test, i.e. that the complaint shall not be obviously
unfounded, should be sufficient because those acts are, in general,
directed against individual persons without requiring further en-
forcement measures. The same holds true in case a judgment is
challenged, at least for the convict. The applicant has, however, to
claim that the court violated his/her basic rights. A misjudgment
itself is not sufficient for filing a constitutional complaint. As the
FCC is not a supreme court of appeal 286 it does not review a case if
ordinary law has been applied correctly or incorrectly. Only a spe-
cific violation of constitutional law (spezifische Verfassungs-
rechtsverletzung) can be challenged before the FCC.287 Such a vio-
lation is given if the court has not recognized the relevance of a
basic right at all, if it has misinterpreted a basic right in abstract
terms or if it has applied the basic right wrongly to the case at
hand.288 A concurring, more recent approach regards the intensity
284. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 1, 2008,
121 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 69 (88) (concerning
the threat of fines).
285. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 18, 1979, 51
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 386.
286. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 10, 1964,
18 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 85 (92).
287. Id. at 92 et seq.
288. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 24, 1971,
30 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 173 (188); see also
KLAUS SCHLAICH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 183 (8th ed. 2010).
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of the encroachment, stating that the more intense it is, the more
in-depth will be the examination by the FCC. 28 9 Irrespective of
that and as a general rule, the mere interpretation and applica-
tion of ordinary law can only be addressed by constitutional com-
plaint if the court acted arbitrarily with regards to what consti-
tutes a violation of the principle of equality according to Article 3
(1) of the Basic Law. In contrast, if a law is challenged as being
unconstitutional, the FCC will undertake, in any case, a full judi-
cial review. The same holds true for law developed by judges.
290
Most problems concern remedies directed against legislative
acts of parliament. In principle and as a matter of subsidiarity,
the applicant is expected to wait for the law to be enforced and to
challenge that enforcement act in front of the ordinary courts be-
fore he/she can bring the case for review by the FCC.291 The court
will then review the act as well as the underlying law on the basis
of the constitution and rule on both manifestations of public au-
thority. As acts of parliament create abstract and general rules,
individuals are seldom likely to be directly affected. However, that
assumption might be rebutted: it does not apply if the applicant
has been induced by the challenged norm to make arrangements
and investments;292 if the executive branch has no discretion 293 or
if waiting for an enforcement act would be unreasonable. 294 The
latter exemption is especially invoked when the norm in question
establishes an obligation, instruction or prohibition. A potential
addressee can hardly be expected to break the law, face enforce-
ment measures - possibly leading to criminal sanctions - before
289. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 27, 1990,
83 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 130 (145 et. seq.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 7, 1990, 81
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 278 (290) (concerning
the intimidating impact of criminal sanctions).
290. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 13, 1982,
59 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 231 (256 et. seq.).
291. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]. May 18, 1982,
60 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 360 (369 et seq.).
292. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 8, 1977, 16
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 147 (159); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 16, 1963, 43
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 291 (386).
293. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 8, 1977, 43
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 291; Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 3, 1981; 59 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 360 (18).
294. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 17, 2009,
122 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 342 (355 et. seq.)
(for clandestine measures and criminal law).
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he/she can concern the courts and finally the FCC with the law,
that in the end might be held constitutional and justify the sanc-
tions taken. Furthermore, the applicant does not have to wait for
a life-threatening act before he/she can take action, such as being
shot down as passenger of an abducted aircraft in the war on ter-
ror.
295
Finally, the applicant has to show a continuing legal interest in
a decision by the FCC. Whereas most of the admissibility re-
quirements have to be given at the beginning of the proceedings,
that interest has to last until the end. Besides the demise of the
applicant, which usually leads to the dismissal of the proceed-
ings,296 the mootness of the encroachment upon basic rights is
worth some discussion. If the restriction of a basic right is fin-
ished, the legal interest persists only in exceptional cases as the
risk of repetition,297 the interest in rehabilitation, 298 a massive
infringement of an important right,299 as well as in those situa-
tions in which public authority acts usually cause a short-term
restriction on basic rights only.
300
Exhaustion of Available Remedies and Subsidiarity
Before he/she can file a constitutional complaint to the FCC, the
applicant has to use every means possible and available at law to
dispel the public authority act3 0 ' - a requirement that even trans-
cends legal remedies in a narrow sense and is underpinned by the
295. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 15, 2006,
115 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 118 (139).
296. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 3, 2004,
109 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 279 (304).
297. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 18, 1979, 52
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 42 (51); Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 19, 2007, 119 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 309 (317 et. seq.).
298. HER1ERT BETHGE, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ, [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACT], § 90, para. 269a (Theodor Maunz / Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu I
Franz Klein / Herbert Bethge eds., 2010).
299. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 8, 1997, 96
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 288 (300); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 20, 1998, 97
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 298 (308).
300. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfGl [Federal Constitutional Court] May 15, 2002,
105 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 239 (246); BVerfG,
28 NVwZ 1281 (2009).
301. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 26, 1988,
77 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 381 (401). But see
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 30, 2003, 107
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 395 (416 et. al.) (more
reluctant).
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assumption that ordinary courts are primarily in charge of pro-
tecting basic rights.3 2 Exhaustion is attained if all admissible
remedies have been filed without success.30 3 If the remedy was
not successful due to admissibility reasons or because of an appli-
cant's fault (e.g. expiration, insufficient legal representation), the
exhaustion requirement is not met unless the court has taken a
decision on the merits. Administrative acts have to be brought
before the ordinary courts. Judgments have to be challenged
through the various stages of appeal lodging any appeal possible.
It is controversial if the applicant has to raise his/her concern
about the constitutionality and name those basic rights he/she
believes to be infringed, though the FCC adhered to this require-
ment for a long time. There is no remedy against acts of parlia-
ment so that an exhaustion in the narrow sense cannot be re-
quired. Only administrative law (statutory orders and rules) can
be challenged under certain conditions in accordance with Section
47 of the Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (Administrative Court Pro-
cedures Code) and any court is entitled to set aside administrative
law it regards to be unconstitutional. However, with reference to
the general principle of subsidiarity, the FCC asks the applicant
to confront the ordinary courts by any legal remedy and within
any proceedings possible with the constitutional concerns against
an act of parliament,30 4 so that those courts may elaborate on the
question and refer it to the FCC according to Article 100 (1) of the
Basic Law for concrete judicial review. The rationale behind the
exhaustion and subsidiarity rule is to relieve the FCC and to make
the ordinary and specialized courts comprehensively prepare the
case30 5 by taking evidence and elaborating on the constitutional
questions so that the FCC can confine itself to a final constitu-
tional examination.
302. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan 8, 1985, 68
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 376 (380); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 26, 1988, 77
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 381 (401).
303. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan 8, 1985, 68
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 376 (380).
304. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan 30, 1985, 69
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 122 (124 et seq.). If a
norm denies access to health insurance, the applicant might be compelled to apply for par-
ticipation and challenge the denial before the ordinary courts. Id. The ordinary courts
would have to refer the question under Art. 100(1) of the Basic Law, otherwise the appli-
cant could bring the final judgment before the FCC via a constitutional complaint. Id.
305. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan 30, 1985, 69
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 122 (125).
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The exhaustion and subsidiary rule does not apply if the ques-
tion is of general importance and transcends the meaning of the
individual case (e.g. concerning the reform of German orthography
(Rechtschreibung),30 6 if the dispute is about the validity of a legal
norm is valid30 7 or if there might be a severe and inevitable harm
for the applicant (e.g. a massive violation,308 due to the existing
jurisprudence no different judgment can be expected; 30 9 that
means mostly bagatelles are excluded).
310
Time Limit
In general, the constitutional complaint shall be lodged and
substantiated within one month, beginning with the notification of
the decision or the pronouncement of a judgment. 311 In cases
where the complaint is directed against a law or a sovereign act
against which no legal action is admissible, the complaint may be
lodged only within one year after the law entered into force or the
sovereign act was announced.3 12 After that year, the law cannot
be directly challenged anymore; although an implicit review re-
mains possible. Whereas in the first case restitutio in integrum is
available if the applicant has not caused the delay, in the second
case it is a cut-off period. 313 In case of an omission, there is no
time limit. However, if a statute is challenged as being insuffi-
cient, the time limit under Section 93 (3) of the FCC Act applies.
3. The Decision and Control Density
Constitutional complaint is successful if the measure challenged
is not only unconstitutional, but furthermore violates basic rights
306. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 14, 1998, 98
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 218 (244).
307. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 14, 1994,
91 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 93 (106).
308. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 23, 1985, 8
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 222 (226).
309. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 3, 1958, 9
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 3 (7 et seq.); Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 14, 1989, 81
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 70 (82).
310. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 17, 1959, 9
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 120 (121 et seq.).
311. Gesetz Uiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 93(1) (Ger.).
312. Id. at § 93(3).
313. Id. at § 93(2).
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of the applicant.314 When it comes to the decision by the FCC, the
control density is interesting and a further proof of the constitu-
tional complaint's double function including an objective interest
in clarifying constitutional questions. Although the applicant has
to invoke his/her concrete basic rights, the FCC regards itself
competent to utilize the entire constitution as a benchmark for
deciding the complaint, unless the applicant himself/herself is not
personally restricted to invoke specific basic rights only.315 This is
the consequence of the FCC's broad interpretation, holding that
constitutional complaint may be used to argue that a law restrict-
ing the general personal freedom according to Article 2 (1) of the
Basic Law, a clause interpreted to cover the right to do or omit
whatever the applicant wants to, does not belong to the constitu-
tional order in a formal or substantive sense.3 16 Accordingly, an
applicant can challenge any law that violates a provision of the
constitution or a constitutional principle as far as it restricts
his/her right to do or omit whatever he/she wants.317 Constitu-
tional complaint, though an individual remedy, has become a tool
of the court for full legal review even including objective provi-
sions of the Basic Law.
If the FCC does not reject the complaint, it explicitly declares
which constitutional provisions have been violated by the act or
omission under review.318 According to the second sentence of Sec-
tion 95 (1) of the FCC Act, the court can declare that any repeti-
tion will violate the Basic Law which is a significant extension of
its competencies. Furthermore, should the constitutional com-
plaint be directed against a decision, the FCC can annul that deci-
sion; if the ordinary courts have been involved before, it refers the
case back to them so that the competent court is able to modify
314. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 22, 1983,
65 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 293 (296); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 29, 1983, 65
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 297 (304); BERND J.
HARTMANN, DIE VERFASSUNGSBESCHWERDE, 185, para. 281, (Bodo Pieroth / Peter Sil-
berkuhl eds., 2008).
315. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 23, 1983,
63 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 197 (205).
316. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 16, 1957, 6
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 32 (41).
317. Compare DIETRICH MURSWIEK, GRUNDGESETZ - KOMMENTAR, Art. 2, para. 42 et
seq. (Michael Sachs ed., 5th ed. 2009). (concerning the attempts of a restrictive interpreta-
tion).
318. Gesetz uiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [FCC Act] [Law on the Federal Consti-
tuional Court], Mar. 12, 1951, BGBL I at 243, § 95(1), Sentence 1 (Ger.).
Spring 2011
Duquesne Law Review
and align its judgment with the interpretation of the FCC. 319 If a
complaint is successful because it is directed against an unconsti-
tutional law or against a decision based on an unconstitutional
law, the respective law shall be declared null and void. 320 That
decision has, similar to the respective decisions in review proce-
dures, the force of law according to Section 31 (2) of the FCC Act.
This, in a nutshell, should suffice to give an idea about constitu-
tional litigation in Germany and about the FCC with its major
tasks of deciding on federal disputes, on the allocation of compe-
tence on a horizontal level and on the protection of basic rights.
Yet, Germany is a member state of the EU and party to the
ECHR. It might therefore serve as an example to demonstrate
that constitutionalism and constitutional litigation in Europe can-
not be thought merely in terms of the nation state anymore. To
round out the picture, the integration of Germany in a European
system of entangled constitutions and interactive forms of consti-
tutional litigation will be briefly addressed.
IV. PATCHWORK CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION BEYOND THE NATION STATE - A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
A. Introduction
By now, constitutionalism and constitutional litigation in Eu-
rope can hardly be thought of merely in terms of the nation
state anymore.
321
Much has been argued about the "constitutionalization" of pub-
lic international law322 and this article is not supposed to contrib-
ute to that general debate. It shall, however, give an example of
constitutionalism and constitutional litigation beyond the nation
state in Europe and for that purpose have a closer look at the EU
and the CoE - the latter being the framework in which the ECHR
was drafted. The ECJ, as the principal judicial organ of the EU
under Article 19 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), as
319. Id. at § 95(2).
320. Id. at § 93(3).
321. Anticipated conclusion by the author.
322. See JAN KLABBERS / ANNE PETERS / GEm ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009). A skeptical stance is taken by Oliver Diggelmann / Tilmann
Altwicker, Is There Something Like a Constitution of International Law?, 68 ZaoRV, 623
(2008) (a critical analysis of the debate on world constitutionalism).
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well as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), estab-
lished by the ECHR, have claimed for their respective founding
treaties, the EU Treaties and the ECHR, to be constitutional doc-
uments. This assumption, as well as the interplay between those
European constitutional orders and the German constitutional
order, pars pro toto, shall now be examined more fully below.
Indeed, the following considerations are based on the, admitted-
ly disputed,323 premise that constitutionalism might exist beyond
the traditional nation state.324 One might even speak of a post-
national concept of constitutionalism, 325 though it has to be
stressed that this form of constitutionalism does not substitute,
but instead complements state constitutionalism. 326 Furthermore,
it should be beyond doubt that the understanding of constitution-
alism cannot be transferred from the state to a supra-state level
on a one to one basis, but - if at all - only mutatis mutandis.327
However, as the origins of constitutionalism lie in the ancient po-
lis328 and the modern state as its successor, the national level shall
be the point of origin for further discussion in order to develop
those features necessary to talk of a constitution and to serve as a
benchmark for the analysis. In brief,329 while talking about con-
stitutionalism one might distinguish between formal and substan-
tial criteria. In a formal sense a constitution enjoys a special sta-
tus within a society as it is often the result of a specific originating
process. Its amendment and abolition are protected and separated
from the political day-to-day business by procedural hurdles and
constitutional provisions enjoy supremacy over ordinary law. In a
substantial sense, the constitution constitutes a polity by deciding
about the institutions and the fundamental rules governing the
323. See Stephan Hobe, Bedingungen, Verfahren und Chancen europdischer Verfas-
sunggebung: Zur Arbeit des Brusseler Verfassungskonvents, 38 EuR 2003, 1, 5 et seq.
(2003).
324. For a broader discussion including arguments against constitutionalism beyond the
nation state see Neil Walker, Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State, 56 POL. STUD.
519-43 (2008). Concerning European constitutionalism compare JOSEPH H. H. WEILER /
MARLENE WIND, EUROPEAN CONsTITUTIONALIsM BEYOND THE STATE (2003).
325. See Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union, 27 EURO.
L. REV. 509, 511 (2002).
326. Stephan Hobe, Bedingungen, Verfahren und Chancen europaischer Verfassungge-
bung: Zur Arbeit des Bruisseler Verfassungskonvents, 38 EUR 1, 7 et seq. (2003).
327. Giacinto della Cananea, Is European Constitutionalism Really "Multilevel', 70
ZAORV 283, 295 - 317 (2010).
328. MAX WEBER, WIRTScHAFr UND GESELLSCHAFT 944 (2005) (describes the polis as a
"constitutionalized fraternization').
329. See Stefan Haack, Der Begriff der Verfassung, 39 EuR 785 - 93 (2004) (discussing
the term "constitution" in an international context).
Spring 2011 399
Duquesne Law Review
society. A constitution in a modern, at least in a western under-
standing, restricts powers, particularly by the acceptance of hu-
man rights, and tries to establish a system of separated powers as
well as checks and balances. Thereby, a constitution realizes
common values and fosters integration.330 Finally and from a
democratic perspective, the constitution traces back to the will of
the people as pouvoir constituant and its final legitimatization.
It might not be such a big surprise that Europe is the experi-
mental ground for constitutionalism beyond the nation state as
that continent has a long tradition of discussions about the ade-
quate conception of the state and other forms of organized socie-
ties. Already Aristotle, as a famous representative of the concep-
tion of eudaimonia, i.e. the question of happiness as the highest
human good and interest, spent some time discussing the various
types of constitutions and addressing the question of which consti-
tution serves the interest of the people best.331 A paternalistic un-
derstanding of the raison d'etre of states was dominant during the
absolutistic times in Europe, however, a constitutional restraint
on the power of the mighty was lacking and therefore the pursuit
of happiness became a justification for oppressing the people.
332
Many European thinkers showed great efforts to set the mighty
free from most limitations; Machiavelli 333 and Hobbes 334 are only
two of them. Eventually, in the late eighteenth century, the
French Revolution (1789) initiated the process of constitutionali-
zation and the end of absolutistic monarchy in which le roi etait
1'etat.335 Individuals (in the understanding at that time meaning
only men) became recognized as enjoying inherent dignity and
human rights and a restraint on public power and the separation
of powers was enshrined. 336 Knowing that the revolution degener-
330. RUDOLF SMEND, VERFASSUNG UND VERFASSUNGSRECHT 40 - 45 et seq. (1928) (ad-
dressing the aspect of integration by the constitution).
331. ARISTOTLE, POLITIK, Book III, Chapter 6 et seq. and Book IV passim, 88 et seq.
(1995).
332. Michael Lysander Fremuth, Gliickseligkeit als Staatsaufgabe? - Zur Geschichte und
Rechtslage in Deutschland, Michael L. Fremuth / Manfred Kulessa I Thomas Weiler,
GLUCKSELIGKEIT DES DRACHENS - DIE PHILOSOPHIE DES GLUCKS IN BHUTAN
UND ANDERSWO, 86, 90 - 100 (2010).
333. Although Niccolo Machiavelli, condemned tyranny, e.g. in Discorsi, he nevertheless
argued in Der FiIrst, in favor of a strong ruler who might commit cruelties if necessary for
the achievement and maintenance of the common good. See NIccOLO MARCHIAVELLI,
DISCORSI, Book I, Chapter 10, 39 (1997); NICCOLO MARCHIAVELLI, DER FORST (1978).
334. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 111 et seq. (1998).
335. Although evidence is lacking, "L'Etat, c'est moi" is attributed to French King Louis
XIV.
336. French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, Art. 1 - 5, 16 (1789).
Vol. 49400
Patchwork Constitutionalism
ated to le r~gne de la terreur and thereby violated its very ideals, a
tremendous change was nevertheless induced by that historic
event. In Germany, it took a bit longer until a constitution con-
taining human rights and constitutional protection of the individ-
ual entered into force. An early attempt, the Paulskirchen-
Verfassung (constitution adopted in the St. Paul Church in Frank-
furt) of 1849, contained a catalogue of directly applicable human
rights starting in Section 130 and even a constitutional complaint-
procedure as enforcement measure under Section 126. As the
Germans lacked a "revolutionary character" like the French, 337 the
framers accepted the rejection of that constitution by German
Emperor Friedrich Wilhelm IV without any vigilance. In conse-
quence, the progressive and liberal Paulskirchen-Verfassung was
dead.338 The following Constitution of the German Empire (1871)
and the Weimar Constitution (1919) fell short of providing a suffi-
cient and effective protection of human rights as well as an ade-
quate limitation on public authority. As shown under Section II
(A) above, the Basic Law was the first constitution for Germany
fully meeting the requirements for calling a legal document a
modern and comprehensive constitution enumerated above. Re-
cently, after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the demise of
communism, the Eastern European states had the chance to be-
come constitutional states. Most of them, just like many others
states, used the Basic Law as a role model.339 This overview
should suffice to sketch the ambivalent history of constitutional
life in Europe.
However, it is not only a story of state constitutionalism Europe
has written. After the devastating effects of two world wars, peo-
ple began to realize that cooperation and integration shall be the
means to prevent war and foster well-being and prosperity in Eu-
rope. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the
first attempt of a special form of integration, limiting the sover-
eignty of the participating states and following the supranational
337. Famous German poet Heinrich Heine once wrote:
Derweil der Michel geduldig und gut
Begann zu schlafen und schnarchen,
Und wieder erwachte unter der Hut
Von vier und dreiBig Monarchen
(German "John Doe" goes to bed after the revolution and awakes under the reign of mon-
archs).
338. Compare WERNER FROTSCHER / BODO PIEROTH, VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE, 155 et
seq. (3d ed. 2002).
339. See Das Parlament, no. 22-23/2010, cover & 3.
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model which has been the template and model for the former EC
and the current EU. Furthermore, the CoE was set up, another
measure to guarantee peace in Europe. Both served that interest
quite well as Europe enjoyed decades of peace for a period un-
known to this formerly quarrelsome continent.
340
B. The Constitutional Architecture of the European Union
"Nous ne coalisons pas des Etats, nous unisons des hommes
" 41
The EU is an international organization that, with the Treaty of
Lisbon and according to Article 1 (3), Sentence 3 of the TEU has
completely absorbed the EC. The ECJ has stressed quite early the
differences between international law and European community
law, making the former EC distinct from other international or-
ganizations.3 42 Without doubt, the EC had several features, at
least in that combination, unknown to other international organi-
zations.343 Those features are described as the supranational
model.3 44 First, it can be said that the EU pursues supranational
aims. The Union, though not being a state, has a broad array of
tasks and serves functions formerly known as classical state func-
tions,345 including a common market, security and social protec-
tion under Article 3. This is a corollary of the phenomenon of
globalization that challenges the states' ability to solve those prob-
lems on their own and asks for a closer cooperation among states.
In the EU, the states share their responsibility for the common
340. EU Council President van Rompuy in a speech on Jan. 17, 2011 has defended the
EU as "fatherland of peace," in which the battlefields have been replaced by negotiation
rooms against growing criticism in Europe. Herman van Rompuy, President, European
Union Council (Jan. 17, 2011), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.euluedocs/cmsdata/docs/pressdatalen/ec/118874.pdf) (Janu-
ary 17, 2011).
341. JEAN MONNET, MEMOIRES (1976) (cover sheet).
342. See Case 13/61, Bosch, 1962 E.C.R., 45 (49); Case 26/62, van Gend & Loos v. Nether-
lands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 1 (25). See also MICHAEL LYSANDER FREMUTH,
DIE EUROPAISCHE UNION AUF DEM WEG IN DIE SUPRANATIONALITAT, 263 et seq. (2010).
343. A short overview of the features making the EU distinct from other international
organizations can be found in ALLAN ROSAS / LORNA ARMATI, EU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION, 12 et seq. (2010).
344. On that term and the features in more detail, see MICHAEL LYSANDER FREMUTH,
DIE EUROPAISCHE UNION AUF DEM WEG IN DIE SUPRANATIONALITAT, 23 et seq. (2010).
345. See Tom Ginsburg / Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV 1583,
1611 (2010) (explaining that the EU is often regarded as a quasi-state while sometimes the
members are described as "quasi-substates').
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good with the EU overall. 346 However, it is not the nature of those
tasks, but their direction that grants them a supranational char-
acter. Those aims intend to impact back in the orders of the
member states with the intention of integrating them. This inte-
grative function, leading to a demise of exclusive "internal affairs"
within most parts of Europe and the emergence of a common Eu-
ropean internal law, is distinct from coordinative aims pursued by
other international organizations.
Second, the supranational model is built on competencies of the
EU that are specific for the ability to address individuals in the
member states directly by legislative, executive and judicial
means. Unlike in public international law and for traditional in-
ternational organizations, no further enforcement or implement-
ing act of the member states is required.
Third, with the EU parliament and commission, being inde-
pendent from the member states, supranational organs347 take
part in the decision-making process. In that respect, supranation-
al decision-making counterbalances the participation of repre-
sentative organs like the council, dominated by the member
states, by inserting a different perspective and interests that
transcend those of particular states. This partly institutional in-
dependence combined with majority voting departs from intergov-
ernmental decision-making in traditional international organiza-
tions. The independence of the organization is further fostered by
its own sources of revenue. Finally, the system of comprehensive
judicial control, exercised by the ECJ, has been regarded as a su-
pranational feature.
Admittedly, those features are hard to find within any other or-
ganization. But against the major opinion in literature348 and the
ECJ (compare the first paragraph of this chapter), that does nei-
ther make EU law a different type of law - as distinct from inter-
national law - nor does it deprive the EU of its status as an inter-
national organization. Public international law knows most of the
346. The ECJ has stated several times that the EC (now EU) pursues a general interest,
which could only be an interest of its own. See, e.g., Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Germany 1989
E.C.R. 02609.
347. The first legal document to use the term "supranational" was Art. 9(5), Sentence 2
of the ECSC-Treaty to describe the independent character of the High Authority (the latter
Commission). Compare MICHAEL LYSANDER FREMUTH, DIE EUROPAISCHE UNION AUF DEM
WEG IN DIE SUPRANATIONALITAT, 26 et seq., 207 et seq. (2010).
348. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29,
1974, 37 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 271 (277). See
also STEPHAN HOBE, EUROPARECHT 104 et seq. (5th ed. 2010).
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features described above - at least in a rudimental status - and it
is flexible enough to enable an international organization to devel-
op into a supranational organization forming a sub-system under
public international law. Public international law has provided
the nucleus upon which the process of European integration could
unfold the supranational model.349 Saying the EU is still an or-
ganization under public international law should not be misun-
derstood as ignoring the significant deviations from traditional
organizations.
Eventually, those supranational features themselves do not
transform the EU to a constitutional order - rather the suprana-
tional character has made the constitutionalization of Europe
much more pressing! The supranational model makes the EU, at
least in part, akin to the traditional state. However, the more the
EU acts like a state, the more important it is to impose limitations
on its powers, comparable to those established for democratic
states dedicated to the rule of law.350 Such limits for states are
mostly established by national constitutions. Accordingly, it
seems advisable to compare the well-known national constitution-
al principles with features to be found on the EU level in order to
find out what may justify the assumption that the EU actually is a
constitutional organization.
In a formal sense, the EU Treaties, the TEU 351 and the TFEU,352
are not named a constitution. Rather, the Constitution for Eu-
rope, 353 a revision and amendment of all the treaties by a Consti-
tutional Convention was rejected by public vote in France and the
Netherlands. However, as proven by the Basic Law, 354 the exist-
ence of a constitution is not a question of names, but rather of
substance. Long before the Constitution for Europe, a strong opin-
349. MICHAEL LYSANDER FREMUTH, DIE EUROPAISCHE UNION AUF DEM WEG IN DIE
SUPRANATIONALITAT, 23 et seq. (2010).
350. The same claim has to be directed against the UN Security Council when that or-
gan acts like an international legislator. See Michael Lysander Fremuth, Private im
Fadenkreuz des Sicherheitsrats - Zu der Terrorliste des UN-Sicherheitsrats, weifien Rittern
und verpassten Chancen 57 Vereinte Nationen (VN) 111, 116 (2009). Against such a compe-
tence of the Security Council see Michael Lysander Fremuth / Jrn Griebel, The Security
Council as a Legislator - a Blessing or a Curse for the International Community?, 76 NJIL
339 (2007).
351. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Art. 13, Dec. 13, 2007,
2008/C 115/01.
352. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Art. 47, Dec. 13, 2007,
2008/C 115/01.
353. Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Art. 1, Dec. 16, 2004, Official Jour-
nal of the European Union, C310.
354. See supra Section II(A).
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ion, on its top the ECJ itself,355 argued in favor of the EC-Treaty
being a constitutional document.35 6 Furthermore, as we are still
talking about international treaties, there is no specific protection
against amendments, but the states can leave the EU,357 alter the
treaties unanimously and even abolish the entire EU. The high
level of protection against amendments including an "eternity
clause" of inviolable principles enshrined in national constitutions
is not reflected on the EU level in a comparable way. That is a
result, though, of the EU still not being a state, but instead an
international organization. 358 Nevertheless, special hurdles are
established by Article 48 of the TEU for treaty amendments, so
that in the absence of unanimity a single state might be compelled
to leave the EU if it does not conform to the constitutional princi-
ples any longer.
Moreover, the source of legitimation provokes some discussions.
Most people agree that no European demos exists.359 While some,
from the absence of a uniform European people, draw the conclu-
sion that there cannot be a (at least sufficient) democratic legiti-
mation of the EU,360 others, convincingly, argue, that the entirety
of the European peoples could provide sufficient democratic legit-
imation for the EU as a political body that shall not be confused
with a state and therefore not be subordinated to the same
rules.
36 1
Respecting those peculiarities of the EU as an international or-
ganization, one does, however, find important substantive consti-
355. Case 294/83, Les Verts v European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339 (German version
only).
356. Paul Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union, 7 EURO. L.J.
125 (2001); Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union, 27 EURO. L.
REV. 509, 511 (2002) (refers topassim calls it "multilevel constitutionalism"); Neil Walker,
Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State, 56 POL. STUD. 519, 533 (2008).
357. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Art. 50(1), Dec. 13,
2007, 2008/C 115/01.
358. The distinction between the EU and the state features are shortly described by in
Allan Rosas and Lorna Armati. ALLAN ROSAS / LORNA ARMATI, EU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
AN INTRODUCTION, 15 et seq. (2010).
359. ANGELA AUGUSTIN, DAS VOLK DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION, 394 (2010); CHRISTIAN
CALLIESS, EUV/EGV, Art. 1, para. 16, (Christian Calliess / Matthias Ruffert eds., 3d ed.
2007).
360. Paul Kirchhof, Demokratie ohne parlamentarische Gesetzgebung? 54 NJW 1332
(2001).
361. Thomas Schmitz, Das europdische Volk und seine Rolle bei einer Verfassungsgebung
in der Europdischen Union, 38 EuR 217 (2003) (talking about the community of EU citizens
that could legitimate the EU and exists besides the national people). See also Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 89
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155 (184).
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tutional principles on the EU level. At first, the principle after
which the constitution and its principles are the highest source of
law can be found on the EU level as well. The treaties and the
general principles, especially human rights,362 constitute the
benchmark for all delegated EU secondary law and agreements
concluded by the EU, 363 which cannot be derogated from even by a
consistent practice of EU organs.364 Furthermore, secondary law
depends on a concrete entitlement of the EU and must not violate
the treaties and the principles established by the ECJ, which ac-
tually is comparable to national ideas of constitutionalism in the
sense of a hierarchy of norms. 36
5
On a horizontal level, the competencies are divided between dif-
ferent organs and differentiated between a legislative, an adminis-
trative and a judicial branch. Simplified, one can say that the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council are primarily responsible for
lawmaking, the European Commission is the administrative body
and the ECJ constitutes the main judicial body. The ECJ has
stated quite early that the relationship between those organs is
ruled by the principle of institutional balance.366 It says that eve-
ry organ is entrusted with specific tasks and asks all organs to
respect the competencies of the respective others. Therefore, a
system comparable to fundamental constitutional principles, in-
cluding a separation of powers as well as checks and balances,
stressed already by Montesquieu367 and Article XVI of the ddclara-
tion des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, also exists within the EU
structures. 368
On a vertical level, the relationship between the EU and its
member states is governed by constitutional principles as well.
362. Joined Cases C-402/05 & C-415/05, Kadi v. Council of the European Union, 2008
E.C.R. 1-6351.
363. Case C-122/95, Germany v. Council, 1998 E.C.R. 1-973.
364. Opinion 1/94, WTO Agreements, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267.
365. See Joined Cases C-402/05 & C-415/05, Kadi v. Council of the Auropean Union,
2008 E.C.R. 1-6351, para. 305 (on the hierarchy of norms); Tobias Lock, EU Accession to the
ECHR: Implications for the Judicial Review in Strasbourg, 35 EURO. L. REV. 777, 783
(2010). See also Michael Gerhardt, Europa als Rechtsgemeinschaft: Der Beitrag des Bun-
desverfassungsgerichts, 43 ZRP 161, 165 (2010) (stressing that supremacy does not lead to
hierarchy between the EU- and the national legal orders).
366. Case 139/79, Maizena v. Council, 1980 E.C.R., 3393, para. 34; Case C-70/88, Par-
liament v. Council, 1990 E.C.R., 1-2041, para. 21 et seq.
367. CHARLES-Louis MONTESQUIEU, OEUVRES COMPLtTES, TOME 1: ESPRIT DES LOIS,
LEVEVRE, book XI, ch. 11, 246 et seq. (1820).
368. But see Giacinto della Cananea, Is European Constitutionalism Really "Multilevel"?,
70 ZAoRV 283, 289 et seq. (2010) (taking a skeptical stance on the attempt to read separa-
tion of powers in the EU context).
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This proposition is especially true for those constitutions govern-
ing a federal entity, a term that has been used for the EC and the
later EU from its very beginning,369 which are familiar with the
principles to be addressed in the following. The principle of su-
premacy according to which the acts of the EU take precedence
over public authority acts of the nation state (also referred to as
"primacy of EU law"), 370 is of utmost importance and is significant
for supranational organizations. It is still controversially dis-
cussed in its details between the ECJ and the national constitu-
tional courts, but it can be regarded as accepted in general.
371
Some constitutional courts argue that the claim for supremacy
might be rejected if the act in question is ultra vires, thereby re-
ferring to another constitutional principle of EU law: the limited
conferral of powers.3 72 As the sovereignty still rests with the
member states, 373 the EU depends on a concrete entitlement be-
fore it is allowed to take action. Th is principle is accompanied by
the principle of subsidiarity 374 as a further limitation of EU pow-
ers. Derived from Catholic social science, 375 subsidiarity poses the
question of which competent level is best for performing a task.
So even if the EU is entitled to act, in case a competence is not
exclusive, subsidiarity can be invoked to hinder the EU if the ob-
jectives of the proposed action can be sufficiently achieved by the
member states.37 6 Indeed, this does contain a presumption in fa-
vor of the competence of the member states, but the ECJ, being
entrusted to decide that question, ensures that the principles of
conferred powers and subsidiarity do not run counter to the inter-
est of European integration. Furthermore, the principle of Union
loyalty (Unionstreue) has a constitutional meaning, asking the EU
369. Manfred Zuleeg, Die foderativen Grundsatze der Europaiischen Union, 53 NJW 2846 (2000);
Christoph Schinberger, Normenkontrollen im EG-Foderalismus - Die Logik gegenidufiger Hier-
archisierungen im Gemeinschaftsrecht, 38 EUR 600 (2003).
370. STEPHAN HOBE, EUROPARECHT 106 et seq. (5th ed. 2010).
371. The controversies are mostly about the foundations of supremacy, be it the national
constitutions or EU law itself, as well as the questions under which exceptional conditions
that the claim for supremacy by EU law may be rejected by national courts.
372. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Art. 5 (1) & (2), Dec. 13,
2007, 2008/C 115/01.
373. Compare FREMUTH, DIE EuROPAiScHE UNION AUF DEM WEG IN DIE
SUPRANATIONALITAT, 290 et seq. (2010); THOMAS SCHMITZ, INTEGRATION IN DER
SUPRANATIONALEN UNION, 237 et seq. (2001).
374. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Art. 5 (1) & (3), Dec. 13,
2007, 2008/C 115/01.
375. STEPHAN HOBE, EUROPARECHT 30, 47 (5th ed. 2010).




and the states as well as organs of both entities to act mutually in
good faith and respect for the respective other.377 The ECJ has
further stressed the duty to cooperate between the member states
and the community's institutions, for instance in the case of
shared competencies when it comes to the negotiation and conclu-
sion of international agreements as well as their fulfillment. 378
Those elements, especially the rule of law and the system of ju-
dicial protection, prompted the ECJ to call the EU a constitutional
order.379 However, today, this assertion is fostered and further
justified by the development of human rights. In the very begin-
ning, the EU was primarily an economic organization. The ECJ
even treated fundamental rights as a threat to the aim of econom-
ic integration. 3 0 It was the FCC that impelled the ECJ to develop
an entire regime of human rights at EU level. The German court
declared, in an early ruling, that it is willing to exercise its juris-
diction even over authority acts of the former EC insofar as the
community legal order did not sufficiently protect basic rights.381
That was the starting signal for an unforeseen development, given
that the ECJ stuck to the principle of supremacy of EU law that
was openly challenged by the ruling of the FCC. Although it
might go too far to say that there was a deal like "human rights
against economic integration and supremacy," after the judgment
of the FCC, the ECJ developed a comprehensive fundamental
rights regime 38 2 - at that time without a clear authorization in the
treaties! The approach of the court is to compare the legal orders
of the member states in order to deduce from them similar funda-
mental rights and to examine if those rights may be applied on the
European level (wertende Rechtsvergleichung); the ECJ further
referred to international human rights treaties as sources of hu-
man rights, 38 3 under which the ECHR enjoys a special status.38 4
377. Case C-2/88, Zwartveld, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3365, paras. 21 et seq.
378. Opinion 1/94, WTO, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267, paras. 106 et seq.
379. Case 294/83, Les Verts v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, para. 23; Opinion
1/91, EEA, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6079, para. 21.
380. Joined Cases 36, 37, 38-59 & 40-59, Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft, 1960 E.C.R.
423 (439); CHRISTIAN WALTER, EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE uND GRUNDFREIHEITEN 10,
para. 27 (2009).
381. Bundesverfassungsgericht IBverfG1 [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974,
37 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE 271 (285).
382. CHRISTIAN WALTER, EUROPMSCHE GRUNDRECHTE UND GRUNDFREIHEITEN 10 para.
25 et seq. (Dirk Ehlers ed., 3d ed. 2009); ALLAN ROSAS / LORNA ARMATI, EU
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, 143 et seq. (2010).
383. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm-Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419, para. 7; Case 5/88,
Wachauf v. Bundesamt fur Ernahrung und Forstwirtschaft, 1989 E.C.R. 2609, para. 17.
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In the meantime, those rights have been codified in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 385 This legal docu-
ment has become binding by reference in Article 6 (1) of the TEU
and presents itself as a modern and comprehensive Human Rights
Document.38 6 Nowadays, individuals in Europe face two sources of
public authority, but at the same time their basic rights are pro-
tected on both levels. However, not only the EU is bound by Eu-
ropean fundamental rights, the member states are also bound if
they act in the scope of EU law.
3 8 7
Moreover, and according to Article 2, Sentence 1 of the TEU, the
EU is dedicated to constitutional principles going beyond individ-
ual guarantees, like the dedication to human dignity and the rule
of law,38 8 liberty, democracy and equality. The ECJ has not con-
fined itself to a mere protection of those principles but developed
further principles like ne bis in idem,38 9 the protection of legiti-
mate expectations, 390 mutual loyalty391 and proportionality. 392
Finally, the ECJ has become a constitutional court that inter-
prets EU law, as the foundation of this unique political entity, and
that decides about the legality of EU (secondary) norms,3 93 vital
questions concerning the allocation of powers, the relation be-
tween EU and member states and fundamental legal guarantees
and rights. Complementary to his/her position as a legal subject
under EU law, the individual has direct access to the ECJ. Fur-
384. Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission of the European Communities, 1974 E.C.R. 491,
para. 13; Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986
E.C.R. 1651, para. 18; Case C-274199 P, Connolly, 2001 E.C.R. 1-1611, para. 37.
385. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/ C, 83/02, 389.
386. CHRISTIAN WALTER, EUROPAiSCHE GRUNDRECHTE UND GRUNDFREIHEITEN 15, para.
38 (Dirk Ehlers ed., 3d ed. 2009).
387. Case 260/89, ERT AE v. DEP, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925, para. 41; ALLAN ROSAS / LORNA
ARMATI, EU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, 147 et seq. (2010); Gero Ziegenhorn,
Kontrolle von mitgliedstaatlichen Gesetzen "im Anwendungsbereich des Unionsrechts" am
Ma/istab der Unionsgrundrechte, 29 NVWZ 803 (2010).
388. Case 294/83, Les Verts v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, para. 23; Case C-
354/04 P, Gestorias Pro Amnistfa v. Council of the European Union, 2007 E.C.R. 1-1579,
para. 51.
389. See Joined Cases C-187/01 & C-385/01, Gziitok & Bruigge, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5689,
para. 25 et seq. See also John A.E. Vervaele, Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Crimi-
nal proceedings against Hiseyin Gozitok and Klaus Brdigge, 41 CMLR 795, 801 et seq.
(2004) (commenting on this judgment and the discussion of ne bis in idem).
390. Case 78/77, Liuhrs, 1978 E.C.R. 169, para. 6.
391. Case C-2/88, Zwartveld, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3365, para. 17.
392. Case C-380/03, Germany v. Parliament and Commission, 2006 E.C.R. 1-11573, para.
144 et seq.
393. See Jean d'Aspremont & Frbdbric Dopagne, Two Constitutionalisms in Europe:




thermore, member states' courts may, under certain conditions
even have to refer a question concerning the interpretation and
application of EU law to the ECJ if the decision of a case depends
on it. In Germany, this duty under EU law is supported by the
interpretation of the constitution by the FCC arguing that the
ECJ is a 'lawful judge" in the sense of Article 103 (1) of the Basic
Law. Hence, a person has the right to claim the ECJ to be in-
volved. If a court does, arbitrarily, not refer a question, this provi-
sion, as a quasi-basic right, would be infringed and the FCC, by
constitutional complaint, can be asked for relief.394 This broad
possibility of access and entanglement between national courts
and the ECJ is unique for an international organization and gives
further proof of its supranational and constitutional character.
Some criticism has been raised regarding the fact that there is no
constitutional complaint on the EU level and suggestions in that
direction have not been successful.3 95 Yet, as the past has shown,
the existing procedures and the entanglement of the courts are
sufficient to guarantee that human rights are adequately protect-
ed under EU law. The lack of an EU constitutional complaint does
hardly affect the ability of the individual to enforce his/her fun-
damental rights. The types of actions provided for in the treaty
enable the individual to invoke his/ her fundamental rights
against EU public authority. He/she can, for instance, file an ac-
tion for annulment against EU secondary law arguing it violates
his/her rights.3 96 This action comes close to constitutional com-
plaint and serves a comparable function. He/she can further ask a
national court to refer a question of EU law within national pro-
ceedings to the ECJ so that EU fundamental rights may become
important even within national proceedings. 397
The ECJ, just like the FCC, has shown its willingness to consid-
er, protect and enforce human rights. It has not only addressed
and decided delicate political issues like the fight against terror-
394. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb.
25, 2010, 1 BvR 230/09, 63 NJW 1268 (2010).
395. See Manfred A. Dauses, Braucht die Europciische Union eine Grundrechts-
beschwerde?, 19 EUZW 449 (2008); Josef Franz Lindner, Fortschritte und Defizite im EU-
Grundrechtsschutz - Plcidoyer fir eine Optimierung der Europaischen Grundrechtecharta,
40 ZRP 54 (2007); Norbert Reich, Zur Notwendigkeit einer Europaiischen Grundrechts-
beschwerde, 33 ZRP 375 (2000).
396. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Art. 263 (4), Dec. 13,
2007, 2008/C 115/01.
397. Id. at art. 267.
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ism, 398 abortion, 399 homosexuality,400 right to family life, 401 free-
dom of expression 40 2 and religion,40 3 but also extended its jurisdic-
tion to acts not covered by the treaties. The court ruled that any
act that intends to produce legal effects for an individual may be
challenged by the person concerned.40 4 Therefore, and just like a
constitutional court, the ECJ has referred to constitutional princi-
ples to justify the development of the law even against written
terms. This scrutiny and willingness of the ECJ to accept, to de-
velop and to enforce fundamental rights prompted the FCC to ac-
cept the supremacy of EU law and the exclusive competence of the
ECJ deciding on it.405 On the other side, the case law of the ECJ
caused a particular sensitivity to judicial activism in the field of
fundamental rights which led to the new Lisbon Treaty inserting
Article 6 (1), Sentence 2 and (2) of the TEU, stating that the hu-
man rights architecture does not establish or extend competencies
of the EU. Furthermore, the United Kingdom and Poland made a
reservation concerning the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, stat-
ing that this document does not provide for rights not contained in
those member states' legal orders.40 6 A recent judgment provoked
further concerns among the member states. In its Mangold-
judgment 40 7 the court struck down a German law that made part
time contracts for older employers more easily accessible to
strengthen their job opportunities. According to the ECJ, this
provision violates the general principle of protection against age
discrimination. Most member states and literature contested such
a principle to exist. In that respect, the FCC was expected to ob-
ject to a judgment of the ECJ on national constitutional grounds
398. Joined Cases C-402/05 & C-415/05, Kadi v. Council of the Auropean Union, 2008
E.C.R. 1-6351.ECJ. Compare Michael Lysander Fremuth, Private im Fadenkreuz des
Sicherheitsrats - Zu der Terrorliste des UN-Sicherheitsrats, wei,6en Rittern und verpassten
Chancen, 57 VEREINTE NATIONEN 111 (2009) (on the UN Security Council's terrorist lists).
399. Case C-159/90, Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685.
400. Case C-267/06, Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. 1-1757.
401. Case C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R.
1-5769 (commented by Michael Lysander Fremuth, 17 EuZW 571 (2006)).
402. Case C-159/90, Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, para. 30 et seq.
403. Case 130/75, Vivien Prais v. Council of the European Communities, 1976 E.C.R.
1589, para. 16.
404. Case C-354104 P, Gestoras Pro Amnistia, 2007 E.C.R. 1-1579, para. 54 et seq.
405. See infra Section IV(D)(3).
406. Art. 1 and 2 of Protocol (no) 30 to the Treaties on the application of the charter to
Poland and the United Kingdom, OJ 2010, C 83, 313.
407. Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9981.
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for the first time ever and to "stop the ECJ."408 However, the FCC
refrained from doing so (see infra IV.D.3).
C. The European Convention on Human Rights and Its Court
"The Court may receive applications from any person, non-
governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to
be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Par-
ties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols
thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder
in any way the effective exercise of this right."409
With the ECHR, there is another important source of human
rights in Europe besides the EU and the well-known international
human right treaties. The Convention entered into force in 1953
and was drafted and adopted in the framework of the CoE, one of
the oldest organizations in Europe that was founded in 1949 after
the Second World War to pacify and unify Europe. Driven by the
allied powers, the CoE was supposed to guarantee human rights
and to serve as a bulwark against the threat of communism
spreading in Europe at that time. The CoE shall not be confused
with the EU as it does not set up a supranational political entity,
but offers a forum for intergovernmental cooperation of nearly all
European states.
The ECHR was labeled as a constitutional instrument of Euro-
pean public order 410 by the ECtHR, the treaty-based court under
the ECHR that is seated in Strasbourg. However, as neither the
ECHR nor the CoE do set up a political entity like the EU treaties,
this claim has to be justified. The ECHR can be regarded as being
a constitutional treaty only with regard to the human rights en-
shrined. As shown above, human and basic rights as a restriction
of public authority constitute an important element of constitu-
tionalism. Indeed, one might object that this would justify calling
any human rights treaty a constitutional document. However, the
ECHR is somehow different from other human right treaties. Af-
ter the accession of the EU to the ECHR, stipulated in Article 6
408. Roman Herzog & Liider Gerken, Stop the European Court of Justice, Published in
German on September 08, 2008 by F.A.Z (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung)
http://www.cep.eu/fileadminluser._uploadlPressemappe/CEP-in denMedienlHerzog-EuGH-
Webseite-eng.pdf.
409. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Apr. 11, 1950, art. 34.
410. Bosphorus v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, § 156 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005); Loizidou v.
Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, § 75 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1993) (preliminary objections).
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(2), Sentence 1 of the TEU, 411 it will establish a minimum human
rights standard not only for nearly all European states, but also
for a supranational organization that can act state-like. Most im-
portant, though, the ECHR provides for individual complaint on
an international level and grants, unlike other major human
rights treaties, direct access to a court.
Admittedly, there is a tendency towards individual complaints
procedures under many international and regional human rights
treaties. 412 However, in most cases the individual can only file an
appeal towards a commission and this opportunity depends on the
consent of the respective state; direct and general access to a court
is hardly granted. 413 Until 1998, the ECHR provided for a com-
mission-procedure as well. The individual could submit a com-
plaint to a commission. That commission examined if the com-
plaint was admissible and founded. After that, the commission as
well as the Committee of Ministers - a political organ - had to
decide about a referral of the case to the court. 414 With Protocol 11
to the ECHR, the commission was abolished and the individual
was granted direct access to the ECtHR by Article 34 of the
ECHR. This right to individual complaint has become mandatory
for all parties to the ECHR and forms an extraordinary step
41 5
under public international law416 and even international human
rights law. The individual has not only been accepted as a partial
subject under public international law, but has also been given the
means to enforce the rights granted. This can be seen as the be-
ginning of a further 17 paradigm shift of public international law
departing more and more from the classical, state-centered West-
phalian understanding. Now, sure enough on a regional level, the
411. The accession depends and is prepared by Protocol 14 (CETS no. 194) to the ECHR
that went into force on 1 June 2010 after the Russian ratification on 18 February 2010. The
amended Article 59 (2) states: The European Union may accede to this Convention.
412. Compare OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, 805 et seq.,
866 et seq., 897 et seq. (2010).
413. WALTER KLIN & JORG KUNZLI, UNIVERSELLER MENSCHENRECHTSSCHUTZ, 250 et
seq. (2009).
414. See Volker Schlette, Das neue Rechtsschutzsystem der Europdischen Menschen-
rechtskonvention, 56 ZAORV 905, 906-914 (1996) (providing a brief overview of this compli-
cated system).
415. Direct access to the courts for individuals is, though, an important element of su-
pranational law.
416. See CHRISTOPH GRABENWARTER, EUROPAISCHE MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTION 41,
para. 1 (4th ed. 2009).
417. Already, the acknowledgment and development of human rights form an important
paradigm shift of public international law. Compare NORBERTO BOBBIO, GEGENWART UND
ZUKUNFT DER MENSCHENRECHTE IN DAS ZEITALTER DER MENSCHENRECHTE 9 (1999).
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individual is able to appeal to a court against any state party to
the ECHR that allegedly has violated his/her rights enshrined in
that document not depending on the latter's consent. Considering
that even states, as original legal subjects of public international
law, depend on the consent of other states they want to sue before
the International Court of Justice, this innovation forms a legal
and dogmatic revolution that might be understood as another form
of constitutional litigation beyond the nation state.
According to Article 34 of the ECHR, any person that claims to
be violated in his/her rights granted by the ECHR can appeal to
the court. This has to be in written terms, a standard form pro-
vided for by the court 418 should be used, and the facts as well as
the violated right shall be duly told. In any case, local remedies
have to be exhausted; in Germany, this includes constitutional
complaint. Correspondingly, the decisions of the German FCC
can be reviewed by the ECtHR. The individual complaint to the
ECtHR has to be filed within six months after the final domestic
decision under Article 35 (1) of the ECHR. As individual com-
plaint has become obligatory for all state parties, no member to
the ECHR can object the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. The declara-
tory judgments of the court are binding on the state parties. The
ECtHR is not confined to rule on a violation of the ECHR, but, in
case of a violation, it can further afford just satisfaction to the in-
jured party. 419 However, unlike the judgments of the ECJ, the
judgments of the ECtHR do not entail direct effect. The court can
neither overrule a domestic judgment nor can an individual, by
virtue of the ECHR, 420 directly invoke the judgment. The state
party is bound only by public international, not supranational law,
to give effect to the judgment and it lies within discretion of the
states how they implement the judgment.
The ECtHR has proven to be an independent and sometimes in-
convenient court, ready to protect human rights effectively even if
this will cause major debates in Europe. Yet, referring to its su-
pervisory function and accepting the states' broad margin of ap-
preciation, the court recently seemed to sometimes avoid taking a
clear stance on the human rights question of a pending case. To
418. European Court of Human Rights Standard Form,
http://www.echr.coe.intfNRlrdonlyres/9D52AE6A-1538-4868-AC63-
1FEA0640ECE3/0OFormulaireGER.pdf.
419. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Apr. 11, 1950, art. 41.
420. Domestic law might enable an individual to rely on the ECHR and the judgments of




give only a few examples of the court's case law: in a chamber
judgment of 2009 the court "banned"4 21 crucifixes from classrooms
to protect negative freedom of religion 422 and the right to neutral
teaching423 of pupils and their parents424 leading to many protests
among clerics, politicians and religious people in Europe. The case
was referred to the Grand Chamber, who in 2011 finally granted
the appeal and dismissed the complaint. 425 Unlike the former
chamber judgment, the Court does not regard the compulsory dis-
play of a crucifix as a violation of the duty of state neutrality or an
indoctrination of the pupils. Rather and referring to the lack of a
European consensus, it holds that the decision about crucifixes in
state-school classrooms, in general, belongs to the margin of ap-
preciation every state enjoys. Even if one accepts this holding, the
court should have spent more efforts to discuss the underlying
questions, be it the content and limitation of freedom from religion
("negative" freedom of religion), be it the criteria governing the
acceptance of a margin of appreciation or be it how to counterbal-
ance antagonistic human rights claims. 426 Another recent judg-
ment has settled a controversial discussion. Once again referring
to the lack of European consensus, the ECtHR declared that the
ECHR does not contain a right to abortion.427 Besides those deli-
cate topics, the court furthermore affirmed that the prohibition of
torture is not open to any exemption 428 - a judgment that found
broad support among scholars and the European public. Another
recent judgment, in which the ECtHR declared in a case against
Germany that a retrospective extension or a retrospective order of
preventive detention violates the ECHR,429 had caused some prob-
lems as in consequence, several detainees had to be released.
They are expected to be a threat to the public what scares many
people and asks for their day-and-night observation. If one ac-
cepts the ECHR to be a constitutional document, the German
state faces the challenge to counterbalance those constitutional
421. Lautsi v. It., App. No. 30814/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009). The Court could not "ban" the
crucifix itself but rendered a declaratory judgment holding that there has been a violation
of the rights mentioned. Id.
422. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Apr. 11, 1950, art. 9.
423. Protocol 1, art. 2.
424. Lautsi v. It., App. No. 30814/06, §§ 48 et seq. (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009).
425. Lautsi v. It., App. No. 30814/06, §§ 59 et seqq. (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011).
426. For a critical comment on the judgment compare Michael Lysander Fremuth, Anno-
tation to Lautsi, 30 NVwZ (forthcoming in 2011)
427. A, B & C v. Ir., App. No. 25579/05, § 214 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010).
428. Gdfgen v. Ger., App. No. 22978/05, §§ 79 et seq. (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010).
429. M. v. Ger., App. No. 19359/04, §§ 79 et seq. (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009).
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rights with the right to protection under the German constitu-
tion430 and has, thus, to reconcile competing constitutional claims.
Just recently and backing the ECtHR ruling on preventive deten-
tion, the German FCC stressed that the Basic Law has to be in-
terpreted in the light of the ECHR and the rulings of the EC-
tHR.431 Bearing in mind that the Basic Law has the final say in
cases of conflict, it has to be analyzed in each specific case if and
how the rulings of the ECtHR can be reconciled with the rights
and principles under the Basic Law. In application of that, the
FCC ruled in the aforementioned judgment that several provisions
concerning preventive detention violate rights under the basic law
in an interpretation that duly takes into consideration the ECHR
and the ECtHR rulings. The ECtHR has explicitly welcomed the
judgment of the FCC.
432
D. The Interplay of Constitutional Legal Orders and the System
of Tiered Judicial Protection in Europe
1. Introduction
As already indicated, if one accepts the existence of various con-
stitutional orders within Europe, concurring constitutional claims
may have to be counterbalanced and conflicts of jurisdiction must
be solved. Accordingly, some final remarks sketching the inter-
play of the constitutional orders and the respective constitutional
courts will be made.
In short, one can say the ECHR provides for the minimum
standard of human rights protection.433 After the accession of the
EU to the ECHR, that treaty will constitute the ultimate bench-
mark for human rights protection in Europe. Domestic law as
well as EU law will have to be in conformity with the rights con-
tained and with their interpretation by the ECtHR but they may
also exceed the guarantees and provide for a higher level of pro-
tection. The member states will not be allowed to go below the
level of protection of human rights under the ECHR and EU law
430. See JOSEF ISENSEE, DAS GRUNDRECHT AUF SICHERHEIT (ZU DEN SCHUTZPFLICHTEN
DES FREIHEITLICHEN VERFASSUNGSSTAATES) (1983); Christoph Link, Staatszwecke im Ver-
fassungsstaat - nach 40 Jahren Grundgesetz, 48 VDStRL 7, 27 et seq. (1990).
431. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 4, 2011,
paras. 85 et seq. (forthcoming).
432. Schmitz v, Ger., App. No. 30493/04, § 41 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011).
433. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Apr. 11, 1950, art. 53;
European Union, Fundamental Rights Charter, Dec. 7, 2000, art. 52 (3) & 53.
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(if applicable). As the ECJ accepts restrictions on European inte-
gration, especially the economic freedoms, justified by the protec-
tion and promotion of human rights, even if they are handled dif-
ferently in the member states,434 the states may grant the highest
level of protection. In the end, though, the ECtHR will have the
final say and be able to review measures of public authority by the
states and the EU.
2. Legal Effects of the ECHR on Domestic and EU Law
First, the domestic law of the state parties has to comply with
the ECHR and their public authority acts are reviewable by the
ECtHR, whose decisions are binding on the respective states. The
state parties might be forced to alter their laws and, as an innova-
tive feature, the court may even sentence a state party to pay a
penalty to the individual violated in his/her rights. As said, those
decisions do not entail direct effect and individuals cannot rely on
them directly. Rather, the states have to decide about the status
and the implementation of the Convention and the court's rulings.
In Germany, the ECHR as an international treaty only has the
status of ordinary law under Article 59 (2) of the Basic Law, 435 so
that a constitutional complaint cannot be based on rights under
the ECHR only. 436 However, according to the rulings of the FCC,
national courts have to read and interpret basic rights under the
German constitution with regard to the jurisprudence of the EC-
tHR. Otherwise courts might violate the rule of law principle.
43 7
By this "dodge" of the FCC, the ECHR is granted a vital role in
interpreting the German constitution likely to avoid conflicts with
the ECtHR. Accordingly, the individual can file a constitutional
complaint based on basic rights, but in the interpretation influ-
enced by the ECHR and the rulings of the ECtHR. Nevertheless,
the Basic Law remains the basis for the work of the courts and the
434. Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbdr-
germeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2003 E.C.R. 1-9609, para. 31, 35; Case C-112122/00,
Schmidberger v. Internationale Transporte und Planzige, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5659 para. 74, 89.
435. CHRISTOPH GRABENWARTER, EUROPAISCHE MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTION 18,
para. 6 (2009).
436. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974,
37 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 271 (274); Bun-
desverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 14, 2004 111
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 307 (317).
437. BASIC LAW Art. 20 (3); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Oct. 14, 2004, 111 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS
[BVERFGE] 307 (316 et seq.).
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final authority in Germany, as the ECHR does not occupy a higher
rank. In conclusion, it is national law that decides about the ac-
tual impact of the ECHR and rulings of the ECtHR.
Second, human rights under the Convention already have an in-
fluence within the EU legal order, even before the accession of the
EU to the ECHR. The ECJ, from the very beginning of its human
rights jurisprudence, has referred to the ECHR and the rulings of
the ECtHR, acknowledging their "special status" as a legal
source.438 Article 6 (3) of the TEU confirms the court's case law
declaring that "fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR..
. shall constitute general principles of the Union's law."439 The
Lisbon Treaty further inserts Article 6 (2) to the TEU, which ear-
marks the accession of the EU to the ECHR.440 How to implement
the accession is still under debate, 441 but after it has been accom-
plished, acts of public authority of the EU will formally be subor-
dinated to the Strasbourg-regime as well.442 Then, every act of EU
authority will have to comply with EU fundamental rights and the
ECHR itself. The ECtHR will be able to review acts of the EU and
to declare them incompatible with the Convention.443 Currently,
the court can only review acts of the state parties implementing
EU law. To protect the ECHR from any evasion, the court has
stressed that, although the parties can transfer competencies to
international organizations, this does not divest them from their
obligation under the ECHR. Rather, the transfer of competencies
presupposes that the ECHR rights continue to be secured.
444
Third, mediated by EU law, the human rights under the ECHR
have a further strong and indirect impact on the domestic legal
438. See supra Section IV(B).
439. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, supra note 350, at art.
6 (as in effect 2005, now Treaty of Lisbon Art 6).
440. Id.
441. Karl-Otto Sattler, Complicated Relationship, Das Parlament, no. 41-42/2010, 11.
441 The German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle recently held his first speech before
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in favor of the ratification of the
ECHR and declared that it is all about creating a uniform human rights standard for all
citizens on European soil. Id.
442. See Tobias Lock, EU accession to the ECHR: implications for the judicial review in
Strasbourg, 35 EuRo. L. REV. 777 (2010) (providing for a broader discussion of the conse-
quences of an accession, especially with regard to the competence of the ECtHR and the
responsibilities of the EU and its member states).
443. It will not be competent to declare them null and void. Such a competence is miss-
ing even today towards the state parties. It will be up to the EU to decide how to implement
the judgment.
444. Matthews v. U.K., App. No. 24833/94, § 32 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999); M.S.S. v. Belgium
& Greece, App. No. 30696/09, § 338 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011).
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orders. For the member states are entirely bound by EU law if
and in as far as they act in the scope the latter's application,
ECHR-human rights channeled into EU law by the ECJ have part
in supremacy and direct effect of supranational law.
3. The Entanglement between the European Constitutional
Courts
With regard to the constitutional courts - the FCC, the ECJ and
the ECtHR - one can already detect a policy of shared responsibil-
ity, mutual trust and reconciliation. Though the further develop-
ment after the accession of the EU to the ECHR has to be waited
for, both the FCC and the ECJ already take into account the rul-
ings of the ECtHR. The ECtHR itself respects in its jurisprudence
a margin of appreciation of the national level and will, most likely,
do the same with regard to EU law. The question of who has the
final say in a case of conflict may be most interesting. It is linked
to the question of sovereignty, even though the Schmittanian doc-
trine, after which sovereignty means the decision of the exception-
al case, 445 most probably will never play a role due to the efforts
paid by the courts to avoid the "final conflict."
The Relation between the ECJ and the ECtHR
After the accession, the ECJ, which already resorts to the case
law of the ECtHR quite often,446 will be formally subordinated to
the ECtHR. Its ruling can be reviewed by the ECtHR, so that in
questions of human rights the ECJ will no longer have the final
say in Europe. However, the ECtHR has already shown its will-
ingness to trustful cooperation among the two courts. The court
not only considers EU law and the case law of the ECJ.447 In the
Bosphorus-case, the ECtHR was asked to rule on a decision of Ire-
land to impound aircrafts leased by a company based in Turkey
but owned by a company in former Yugoslavia. The UN Security
Council had adopted a resolution asking for the freezing of all as-
sets and the EU had enacted secondary legislation to implement
that resolution. Ireland felt bound by EU law not to release the
aircrafts and the ECJ confirmed that interpretation. The appli-
cant argued before the ECtHR that his right to property as pro-
445. CARL SCHMITT, POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE, VIER KAPITEL ZUR LEHRE VON DER
SOUVERA NITAT 11 (1934).
446. See supra Section IV(B).
447. Pellegrin v. Fr., App. No. 28541/95, §§ 37 et seq. 66 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999).
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vided for by Art. 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR was violated. The
ECtHR responded that it does not review an implementation
measure of a state to comply with EU law as long as that organi-
zation is considered to protect fundamental rights in a manner at
least equivalent to the level of protection of the ECHR. According
to the court, there is a presumption that the state has not depart-
ed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more
than implement legal obligations following from its membership.
This presumption can be rebutted if, in a particular case, the pro-
tection of rights also protected by the ECHR is "manifestly defi-
cient." However, according to the ECtHR the protection of funda-
mental rights by the EC (now the EU) can be considered to be, and
to have been at the relevant time, "equivalent" to that of the Con-
vention system. 448 Thus, Ireland had not violated the property
right of the applicant.
Currently, the ECtHR is not competent to review acts of the EU
but limited to implementing acts of the state parties. However,
with Bosphorus, the ECtHR has shown a notable judicial restraint
towards acts impelled by the EU law and seems to have engaged
in a form of judicial cooperation trusting the EU human rights
protection and confining itself to a surveillance authority. Howev-
er, most recently, in an asylum-case, the court has stressed that
the presumption only applies to strict international obligations
and it rejected the presumption of equivalent protection in case
the state party enjoys discretion whether to take a measure
(transferring the asylum-seeker to another country) or not.
449
Good arguments exist that after the accession of the EU this con-
fidence towards and special status of the EU and the ECJ might
be repealed 450 and a recent common statement from the Presidents
of both courts supports this assumption.451 Yet, the ECtHR might
recognize the value and mutual benefit of a tiered responsibility
and competence approach, not only to reduce its own workload but
also as a contribution to a collaborative human rights protection
within Europe, and therefore adhere to the Bosphorus-
presumption. It might be more likely, though, that the ECtHR
will not retract its jurisdiction but grant the EU the same margin
448. Boshporus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim $irketi v. Ir., App. No. 45036/98,
§§ 155 et seq. (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005).
449. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09, § 340 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011)
450. Tobias Lock, EU accession to the ECHR: implications for the judicial review in
Strasbourg, 798 35 EURO. L. REV. 777 (2010).
451. Joint Communication from the Presidents of the ECtHR and the ECJ of Jan. 24,
2011, available at 38 EuGRZ 95 (2010) (Ger.).
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of appreciation as it does to the state parties. In that case, mutual
cooperation and trust between the courts will not be a question of
jurisdiction, as it is in FCC's approach in Solange II (see below),
but of control density.
The ECtHR, Domestic Law and the German FCC
The ECtHR has a huge amount of power. It remains, though, an
international court without the ability to enforce the judgments by
itself. The ECtHR cannot annul judgments of the FCC but it can
rule differently on the topic and grant the individual financial re-
dress. The FCC will bear in mind the interpretation of the ECtHR
as otherwise Germany would continuously be in violation of its
international human rights obligations which is not only a breach
of public international law but runs furthermore counter to the
Basic Law's commitment to international law (Volkerrechtsfreun-
dlichkeit).452 However, how to reconcile and align national law
with the rulings of the ECtHR, is up to the nation state to decide.
Thus, the court and the applicant depend on the willingness of the
state parties to comply with the judgments. In that respect, it
should be acknowledged that the ECtHR accepts the limits of its
competence and leaves the state parties with a broad margin of
appreciation. It does not provide abstract judicial review in cases
of individual complaints but confines itself to examine the issues
raised by the case before it. 453 Furthermore, it explicitly recogniz-
es the variety of legal systems in Europe and stresses that it is not
the court's task to standardize them. 454 In a recent case on abor-
tion, the court confirmed this approach, stating that no right to
abortion exists and that states can establish tough restrictions
even if the majority of European states showed a more liberal ap-
proach.455 Regarding and considering the constitutional legal or-
ders of the state parties, the court opens a dialogue and pays trib-
ute to the mutual impact of the legal orders that may avoid pro-
voking conflicts and resentments as well as incomprehension in
society.
On the other side and exemplified by the judgment on preven-
tive detention, the ECtHR is willing to decide contrary to a consti-
tutional court (the FCC) and the major opinion within a state. In
452. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 14, 2004,
111 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 307 (317).
453. N.C. v. It., App. No. 24952/9402, § 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002).
454. Tuxquet v. BeIg., App. No. 926/05, § 83 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010).
455. A, B & C v. Ir., App. No. 25579/05, §§ 231 et seq. (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010)
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conclusion, one might say that the court tries to develop a common
denominator generally deduced from the states' legal orders.
456
However, there is an autonomous interpretation of the Conven-
tion 457 and the court does not shrink from protecting that ap-
proach even against the state parties and the public opinion. On
the other side, as shown above, the German FCC, referring to the
rule of law, Article 20 (3) of the Basic Law, gives the ECHR and
the ECtHR's rulings a strong meaning within the German legal
order thereby trying its best to avoid a conflict. Yet, the court does
not leave doubts that it is up to the national courts, and finally the
FCC, to decide on the basis of the domestic constitution even if
this would amount to a breach of international law. This is due to
the conviction that the sovereignty of Germany still rests in the
Basic Law45 8 - a conviction that plays an important role for the
stand taken by the FCC towards EU law as well.
The Cooperation between the ECJ and the FCC
Though one might agree with the FCC calling the relation be-
tween both courts a relation of cooperation, 459 the legal founda-
tions in their final consequence remain controversial even though
the practical relevance is limited. The controversy is provoked by
the different views on the relation between EU law and the law of
the member states.
The ECJ stresses that the EU and its laws are different from
traditional international organizations and from public interna-
tional law respectively. As a different source of law having a su-
pranational and autonomous character, EU law is characterized,
inter alia, by the principle of supremacy. 460 Accordingly, domestic
provisions cannot be invoked against EU law. From this point of
view, EU law prevails even over domestic constitutional law.
Bearing in mind its self-conception as the constitution's defender,
the FCC felt uneasy hearing those words from Luxembourg. Alt-
hough the FCC accepts the claim for supremacy by the ECJ,461 its
justification differs. The court emphasizes that only the national
456. K6nig v. Ger., App. No. 6232/73, § 88 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1978).
457. Id.
458. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 14, 2004,
111 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 307 (319).
459. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993,
89 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155 (175).
460. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585 (593).
461. See MICHAEL LYSANDER FREMUTH, DIE EUROPAISCHE UNION AUF DEM WEG IN DIE
SUPRANATIONALITAT 135 et seq.
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constitution can open the understanding of statehood for suprem-
acy of acts not deriving from the state; thus, supremacy is only
granted under the conditions and to the extent the Basic Law al-
lows for it.462 In its early Solange I-ruling,463 the FCC has stated
that it will exercise its jurisdiction to protect basic rights even
against supranational acts of public authority from the former EC.
This triggered the human rights jurisprudence of the ECJ. In
Solange JJ,464 the FCC undertook an in-depth scrutiny to show
that the standard of fundamental rights on EU level is sufficiently
comparable to the indispensable national standard under the
Basic Law. Therefore, the court is able to refrain from exercising
its jurisdiction but only as long as ("solange") the ECJ provides for
an effective and generally sufficient protection standard that en-
sures the essence of fundamental rights and is substantially com-
parable to the standard granted by the Basic Law. Unlike the EC-
tHR, and more EU friendly, the FCC refers to the general level of
protection whereas the ECtHR in Bosphorus reserves exercising
its competence in every individual case. In Maastricht, a decision
on the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht establishing the EU,
the FCC confirmed Solange H but stressed the claim for national
sovereignty and asserted that its relation to the ECJ is governed
by an understanding of judicial cooperation as both courts protect
human rights on the respective level in mutual respect and under-
standing.465 The following Bananenmarktordnung-decision466 had
a great impact on constitutional litigation, as the FCC stated that
constitutional complaints as well as applications for concrete judi-
cial review by the courts against supranational acts are only ad-
missible if the applicant/referring judge, after a comprehensive
examination of the case law of the FCC and the ECJ, can prove
that the level of human rights protection on EU level had fallen
below the generally sufficient standard compared with the Basic
Law. This requirement can hardly be met so that constitutional
462. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986,
123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 267 (344, 354).
463. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974,
37 ENTSCHE1DUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 271 (285).
464. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 30, 2009,
73 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 339 (377 et. seq.,
387).
465. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993,
89 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155 (174 et. seq., 186
et. seq.).
466. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 7, 2000,
102 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 147 (164).
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complaints against supranational acts may be presumed to be
generally inadmissible. In its recent Lissabon-ruling, 467 dealing
with the establishment of the new EU merging the former EC and
EU into one single personality, the court confirmed its previous
decisions. Going further, it explicitly stressed its willingness to
exercise its jurisdiction against ultra vires acts of the EU (ultra
vires review) and acts violating the constitutional identity of the
Basic Law (identity review) in order to defend the effectiveness of
the right to vote and democratic self-determination. 468 A show-
down was awaited for the FCC's Honeywell decision 469 as a reac-
tion to the ECJ's decision in Mangold.470 In the latter judgment,
the ECJ asserted the existence of a general principle of non-
discrimination in respect of age in addition to the basis of that
principle under EU secondary law.471 Many scholars 472 accused
the ECJ of transgressing its competencies and expected the FCC
to object, for the first time and in accordance with its ruling in
Lissabon, to the case law of the ECJ by exercising its reserved
competence to ultra vires review against supranational acts. Yet,
the FCC concretized Lissabon, some even argue deviated from
it, 4 73 and stated that it is only able to review in a manner open
towards European law, requiring a breach of competence by EU
bodies to be sufficiently qualified and the ECJ having been asked
to reassess its disputed jurisprudence before allowing for review.
For that, the act in question has to be manifestly in breach of
competencies, leading to a structurally significant shift to the det-
riment of the member states in the structure of competencies be-
tween them and the EU. The court consequently left open wheth-
er such a general principle against age discrimination exists and
rejected the complaint as, in any case, such a significant shift had
not occurred. 474 In consequence of this jurisprudence, an action
against EU law will hardly ever be even admissible. So, in prac-
467. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986,
123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 267 (339 et seq., 353
et seq.).
468. BASIC LAW Art. 38(1); BASIC LAW Art. 23(1); BASIC LAW Art. 79(3).
469. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 6, 2010,
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht [DFR] 2 BvR 2661/06.
470. Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9981.
471. See supra Section IV(B.).
472. See Roman Herzog / Luder Gerken, Stop the European Court of Justice, Published
in German on September 8, 2008 by F.A.Z (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung).
473. 2 BvR 2661/06, 96 (Landau, J., dissenting); see opinion Judge Landau, paras. 96 et
seq.; also Daniel Gehlhaar, Honeywell in der Praxis, Ein Aus- und Uberblick, 27 NZA 1053
(2010) (arguing that this decision goes beyond the Lissabon-ruling).
474. 2 BvR 2661/06, para. 53 et seq.
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tice a conflict is not likely to emerge as both courts show the ten-
dency to trustful cooperation in order to avoid a case of serious
conflict.
E. Conclusion
In Europe, we observe a more and more entangled system of
constitutional legal orders with their respective constitutional
courts. Europe, thereby, may offer an important model of how to
address challenges of globalization on the state, supranational and
international level while at the same time protecting those (consti-
tutional) guarantees generations have fought for.
There is much weight in arguing that sovereignty still rests in
the nation states, 475 i.e. those entities that have proven to be the
best ones in size, structure and tradition to integrate a polity and
protect the individual's rights. But other defenders of the common
good and the individual have been created, not only to control the
states. As globalization increasingly transcends the abilities of
the traditional nation state, international organizations have been
entrusted with former state functions and granted means analo-
gous to the states. Accordingly, they have to observe and they are
bound by comparable restrictions. Their respective courts are re-
quested to ensure that those organizations comply with these ex-
pectations.
Surely, there will be conflicts in future times about sovereignty,
competencies and supremacy. But in a more a more complex
world, only a system of multi-tiered responsibilities and compe-
tencies, of trustful cooperation and mutual enrichment can grant
security, peace, prosperity and happiness for the people.
As it has been demonstrated, the European constitutional courts
are working on the alignment and balancing of their jurisdiction
and jurisprudence to reconcile and foster different elements of
constitutionalism and human rights protection in Europe. What
seems to emerge, though on a minimal and initial level, is an over-
lapping common and comprehensive European constitution.
Though inspired and nourished by the other written constitutional
documents (ECHR, EU law and domestic constitutions), that
overall European patchwork constitution is different from them.
It forms the idea behind mutual comparison of constitutional or-
ders and the attempt to deduce common principles and under-
475. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986,
123 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 267 (346 et seq.).
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standings that react back on the interpretation of the document to
apply in a specific case. In that sense, European constitutionalism
is a patchwork comprising of different constitutions, connecting
and forcing them to interact. Yet, that overall European patch-
work constitution is like a rag rug: the common picture is broader
than the single patches.
Especially the individual is the winner of that process as can be
seen by the triplication of human rights protection. Unlike else-
where in the international sphere, the individual, under certain
conditions, has or - after the accession of the EU to the ECHR -
will have three courts to appeal to if he/she regards himself/herself
violated in fundamental rights. The individual does not exist for
the state but the state for the individual. 476 Accordingly, interna-
tional organizations, including their respective courts, that fulfill
state functions and - in part - act like states have to constantly
demonstrate their dedication to the individual as the final reason
for all law and efforts in the world.
477
A well-tuned and connected system of constitutional litigation
on all relevant levels might grant them that chance and, accord-
ingly, persuade the individual to vote in favor of his/her state and
its international and supranational integration by a daily plebi-
scite (plebiscite de tous les jours).
478
476. BASIC LAW Art. 1(1) (Herrenchiemsee-proposal for the Basic Law); NORBERTO
BOBBIO, DAS ZEITALTER DER MENSCHENRECHTE 52 (1999).
477. WOLFGANG GRAF VITZTHUM, VOLKERRECHT, 27, para. 60 (Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum
ed., 5th ed. 2010). From the perspective of a sociological interpretation of public interna-
tional law, see GEORGE SCELLE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 410 et seq. (1944).
478. Ernest Renan, in his famous speech at Sorbonne addressing the nation, stated that
"l'existence d'une nation est [...] un plgbiscite de tous les jours, comme l'existence de
lindividu est une affirmation perpdtuelle de vie." ERNEST RENAN, QU'EST-CE QU'UNE
NATION? (1882). He is, furthermore, said to have anticipated the European integration as
he assumed that the nation state might be replaced by a European confederation.
426 Vol. 49
